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Symposium Article 
Transitional Post-Occupation Obligations under the Law of Belligerent Occupation 
Dana Wolf 
Abstract 
Today’s armed conflicts present far more varied and complex 
circumstances of occupation, extending beyond the traditional 
model of interstate war on which the law of belligerent occupation 
was originally based. As a result, confusion abounds regarding 
when the duties and obligations of an occupier are triggered, 
while scholarly debate revolves around the meaning of the law of 
belligerent occupation and its alleged inadequacies in the 
transition from occupied to post-occupied territory. The 
unfortunate consequence is that civilian populations often face 
serious humanitarian risk at the conclusion of a belligerent 
occupation. 
Various proposals attempt to remedy this gap by addressing 
whether international law imposes continuing duties upon a 
former occupier with respect to a previously occupied territory 
and the civilian population. Focusing on the law of belligerent 
occupation, this article argues that, as a legal matter, the law of 
belligerent occupation does not create an ongoing regime of post-
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occupation duties for the former occupier. However, the law of 
belligerent occupation offers possibilities to address the problem 
of civilian protection through an expanded understanding of 
coordinated transition from the former occupier to the returning 
sovereign. To fill the legal vacuum, this article proposes that some 
form of limited transitional post-occupation obligations should 
be triggered under certain circumstances when the end of 
occupation is approaching and identifiable gaps exist in essential 
governance and civilian protection. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The unfortunate consequence of contemporary conflicts is 
the serious humanitarian risk that civilian populations often 
face at the conclusion of a belligerent occupation. Due to open 
legal questions and gaps in the law, there is no consensus 
regarding which obligations concerning governance, security, 
and public order are assigned to parties in a conflict. Calls in the 
international community to fill at least some of these gaps 
through legal rubrics, such as post-occupation duties, 
irrespective of the body of law from which they originate, aim to 
address the practical, undeniable needs of affected civilian 
populations.1 
This issue of civilian protection in post-occupation 
situations became a focus of discussion among international law 
scholars in reaction to two events: the Security Council 
Resolution to end the occupation by the Coalition forces in Iraq 
in 2004 and the case of Gaza after Israel’s unilateral withdrawal 
in 2005.2 In the latter instance, multiple legal issues arose with 
 
 1. A complete answer to the international law question of post-occupation 
duties would have to take into account several major bodies of international 
law, including the law of belligerent occupation, (international humanitarian 
law), international human rights law, the law of state responsibility, and others. 
This article confines itself to an examination of the question solely under the 
law of belligerent occupation. It sets aside other bodies of international law for 
another day, save for brief asides to suggest possible directions for synthesizing 
a full legal analysis. 
 2. See EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 9–10, 
254–55 (2d ed. 2012). In 2004, the U.N. Security Council recognized the end of 
the United States-led occupation of Iraq, despite the fact that military troops 
remained in Iraq until 2011, retaining a substantive level of control over the 
territory. S.C. Res. 1546 (June 8, 2004) (“Welcoming the beginning of a new 
phase in Iraq’s transition to a democratically elected government, and looking 
forward to the end of the occupation and the assumption of full responsibility 
and authority by a fully sovereign and independent Interim Government of Iraq 
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regard to the application of the law of belligerent occupation, 
based on the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) decision in the 
Al-Bassiouni case (2008).3 It is significant that these are the only 
two cases where the law of belligerent occupation was invoked 
and adhered to by an occupying state.4 
Civilian protection became primary because today’s armed 
conflicts present far more varied and complex circumstances of 
occupation, extending beyond the traditional model of interstate 
war on which the law of belligerent occupation was originally 
based. According to the traditional interstate war paradigm, 
occupation is a temporary incident of conflict that begins with a 
hostile army invading a territory, establishing its forces there 
and exercising effective control over the territory and its 
population.5 
As follows, reversal of these elements signifies the end of 
occupation. In some cases, this event might be conterminous 
with the end of the conflict, wherein a negotiated peace 
 
by 30 June 2004.”). The presence of United States-led forces after the end of 
occupation was ratified by an agreement with the local temporary government. 
BENVENISTI, supra, at 254–55. 
 3. HCJ 9132/07 Gaber Al-Bassiouni v. Prime Minister. ¶¶ 12–15 (2008) 
(Isr.) (unpublished), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/07/320/091320.n25.htm. 
In 2008, following ongoing acts of hostility by Hamas against Israeli citizens 
and Israel’s decision to impose further restrictions upon the Hamas regime 
including fuel and electricity reductions, a petition was filed to the Israeli HCJ 
against the government’s decision. The HCJ confronted the question of whether 
the various restrictions upon the supply of fuel and electricity to Gaza harmed 
the essential humanitarian needs of the local residents. The court stated: “We 
should point out in this context that since September 2005 Israel no longer has 
effective control over what happens in the Gaza Strip. Military rule that applies 
in the past in this territory came to an end by a decision of the government, and 
Israeli soldiers are no longer stationed in the territory on a permanent basis, 
nor are they in charge of what happens there. In these circumstances, the State 
of Israel does not have a general duty to ensure the welfare of the residents of 
the Gaza Strip or to maintain public order in the Gaza Strip according to the 
laws of belligerent occupation in international law. Neither does Israel have any 
effective capability, in its present position, of enforcing order and managing 
civilian life in the Gaza Strip. In the prevailing circumstances, the main 
obligations of the State of Israel relating to the residents of the Gaza Strip 
derive from the state of armed conflict that exist between it and the Hamas 
organization that controls the Gaza Strip; these obligations also derive from the 
degree of control exercised by the State of Israel over the border crossing 
between it and the Gaza Strip, as well as from the relationship that was created 
between Israel and the territory of the Gaza Strip after the years of Israeli 
military rule in the territory, as a result of which the Gaza Strip is currently 
almost completely dependent upon the supply of electricity from Israel.” Id. 
 4. BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 203, 249. 
 5. Id. 
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agreement includes a reversion of the rights and duties of 
governance from the occupier back to the sovereign. In other 
cases, however, this event may be merely a withdrawal of 
occupation under the adversary’s military pressure as the 
greater conflict continues. Whether the conflict continues or 
ends with the occupation, the law of belligerent occupation is 
best understood to mean that the former occupier is no longer 
subject to the legal duties of occupation (except for the legal 
requirements to remedy wrongs done during the occupation). 
Due to the changed circumstances of many occupations 
today, confusion abounds as to when the duties and obligations 
of an occupier are triggered. Contemporary conflicts range 
across a wide variety of contexts, rendering many shades of gray 
rather than a simple on-off switch for determining when an 
occupation is underway. When no such bright line for occupation 
exists, there is also no clear trigger to signal when the 
responsibilities of the occupier for governance of the occupied 
territory and its population begin and end. These contemporary 
situations can include any of the following: refusal by a state to 
even acknowledge that its military forces are occupying 
territory, or recognize that it has the duties of an occupier 
according to the law of belligerent occupation; questions of 
whether occupation law applies to contemporary, legally novel 
situations of humanitarian intervention where armed conflict is 
undertaken for the protection of the population of the “occupied” 
territory from its own government; situations in which the 
armed forces of the occupying state only gradually withdraw or 
unilaterally withdrawal, leaving open legal questions as to 
whether or when the occupation—and, presumably, the duties of 
the occupier—come to an end and over what timeframe; 
situations in which the legal status of foreign armed forces 
changes through agreement with the new government of the 
legitimate sovereign or by a binding determination of the United 
Nations Security Council.6 
 
 6. See S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004) (recognizing 
the end of the U.S.-led occupation in Iraq, despite the fact that United States 
military troops remained in the territory and retained a substantive level of 
control over the territory, ratified by an agreement with the temporary 
government); Kristen E. Boon, Obligations of the New Occupier: The Contours 
of a Jus Post Bellum, 31 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 57, 65 (2009) 
(highlighting factors that incentivize occupying forces to deny obligations); 
Tristan Ferraro, Determining the Beginning and End of an Occupation Under 
International Humanitarian Law, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 133, 157 (2012) 
(determining the end of occupation through progressive phasing out or sudden 
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The debate within the international community revolves 
around the meaning of the law of belligerent occupation and 
what some would argue are its inadequacies in this context. A 
common critique tackles the binary legal conditions in the 
existing law, which erroneously assumes the facts will always 
render an easy judgment to determine if occupation law is 
occurring or not. 
As mentioned, today’s conflicts and occupations rarely have 
a clear, negotiated ending; the various stages are now marked 
by de facto processes rather than formal, legal ones. These can 
include, for example, a longer process of transferring authority 
and the absence of a peace agreement or any negotiated process, 
often resulting in a vacuum of governance authority. Under such 
circumstances, if an occupier’s duties end when the occupation 
ends, the possibility remains that, for a period and perhaps 
permanently, no party takes on the rights and duties of the 
sovereign for providing governance, order, and provision of 
essential public services to the affected population. 
Various proposals have been offered and discussed by 
scholars to remedy this gap by addressing the question of 
whether international law imposes continuing duties upon a 
former occupier with respect to a formerly occupied territory and 
its civilian population. Many of them draw upon bodies of law 
such as human rights law and the law of state responsibility, 
which are beyond the scope of this article.7 Instead, this Article 
 
withdrawal). 
 7. See id. at 89; Eyal Benvenisti, The Law on the Unilateral Termination 
of Occupation (Tel Aviv Univ. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 93, 2008), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1254523 [hereinafter, Benvenisti, Unilateral 
Termination]; Eric De Brabandere, The Concept of Jus Post Bellum in 
International Law, in JUS POST BELLUM: MAPPING THE NORMATIVE 
FOUNDATIONS 123, 123–41 (Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday & Jens 
Iverson eds., 2014); Yael Ronen, Post-Occupation Law, in JUS POST BELLUM: 
MAPPING THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS 428, 428–46 (Carsten Stahn, Jennifer 
S. Easterday & Jens Iverson eds., 2014); Yuval Shany, The Law Applicable to 
Non-Occupied Gaza: A Comment on Bassiouni v. The Prime Minister of Israel, 
42 ISR. L. REV. 101, 114–15 (2009) [hereinafter Shany, Bassiouni]; Yuval Shany, 
Faraway So Close: The Legal Status of Gaza after Israel’s Disengagement, 8 Y.B. 
INT’L HUM. L. 369, 369–83 (2005) [hereinafter Shany, Faraway]; Ralph Wilde, 
Are Human Rights Norms Part of the Jus Post Bellum, and Should They Be?, in 
JUS POST BELLUM: TOWARDS A LAW OF TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE 
163, 163–86 (Carsten Stahn & Jann K. Kleffner eds., 2008); Boon, supra note 6, 
at 76–77. 
I would just briefly emphasize that it is more or less accepted among the 
scholars cited here that post-occupation obligations cannot be governed 
primarily by human rights law, and its application should not serve as a reason 
to displace the clear and established normative framework of the law of 
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focuses on the law of belligerent occupation. It argues that as a 
legal matter, the law of belligerent occupation does not create an 
ongoing regime of post-occupation duties of the former occupier 
because it is concerned not only with civilian protection, but also 
with ensuring that occupation should be a temporary condition 
and not a mechanism for creeping annexation. 
It seems, however, that the law of belligerent occupation 
does offer certain possibilities for addressing the problem of 
civilian protection through an expanded understanding of its 
existing terms on coordinated transitions from the former 
occupier to the returning sovereign. To fill the legal vacuum, this 
Article proposes that some form of limited transitional post-
occupation obligations should be triggered under certain 
circumstances such as, among others, when it is known that an 
end of occupation is approaching that entails a complex process 
or requires a longer time period. Another trigger would occur 
when the end of occupation is not concluded by a peace 
agreement and where the specific circumstances indicate that 
the local governing authority would not be fully restored with 
the end of occupation. Thus, when the end of occupation is 
approaching, and gaps appear in essential governance issues, 
transitional post-occupation obligations should be limited in 
time and scope and reached by negotiation and/or coordination 
between the local government and the former occupying power. 
Section II of this paper analyzes the law of belligerent 
occupation and its legal framework to underscore the 
inadequacies of the law in contemporary conflicts. Section III 
explores certain weaknesses of the doctrinal, traditional 
paradigm of the law of belligerent occupation, particularly with 
respect to the end of occupation as it occurs in contemporary 
situations, which can, in some cases, leave the territory at risk 
of a vacuum in governance. Section IV illustrates that as a legal 
matter, the law of belligerent occupation does not create an 
ongoing regime of post-occupation duties of the former occupier. 
To fill this gap, Section V aims to set a structure for the evolution 
of international law in order to adapt the existing law of 
 
occupation. The law of state responsibility, as a secondary norm, might apply 
only during the occupation and transitional period as long as effective control 
exists but not in its aftermath. The remedy of compensation for wrong-doing in 
the past would be meaningless at the aftermath stage when the population 
lacks basic infrastructure and public institutions. Ongoing provision of 
essential governmental services is more relevant for the local population after 
the end of occupation. 
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belligerent occupation to today’s heterogeneous situations of 
conflict and occupation. I consider the features of a slightly more 
expansive reading of the law of belligerent occupation’s existing 
transitional measures, one that might capture most 
contemporary gaps by treating the post-occupation duties of 
civilian protection as a “package” of the rights and duties of 
governance to be transferred from departing occupier to 
returning sovereign. 
II. THE END OF MILITARY OCCUPATION AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES 
The legal questions of post-occupation duties arise in part 
from the answers to vital preceding questions: What constitutes 
the end of occupation in a legal sense and what are its legal 
consequences? In other words, can a former occupier continue, 
at least in part, to exercise an occupier’s duties through the 
effects of its acts, or its failures to act, even after it physically 
departs the occupied territory? And who bears responsibility for 
governance of a territory, or the failure to govern, at least in 
terms of minimum security, public order, and services, following 
the end of occupation? The legal question of what constitutes the 
end of occupation thus has large and practical implications with 
respect to the three basic actors in occupation law: the occupier, 
the legitimate sovereign, and the local population affected by 
occupation.8 
Although the abstract meaning of the term “end of 
occupation” might be obvious, the criteria for determining its 
existence, and hence the applicability of the substantive rules of 
occupation, are less than perfectly clear.9 The law of belligerent 
occupation does not provide a roadmap for terminating a 
military occupation. It offers neither a definition of the end of 
occupation nor a criterion for when it has been reached. In the 
absence of a precise definition for the termination of military 
occupation, a definition of the commencement of military 
occupation, as outlined in Article 42 of the 1907 Hague 
 
 8. See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Occupation and Territorial 
Administration, 1–3 (Glob. Tr., Working Paper No. 11/2015, 2015) (explaining 
the law of occupation and the evolution of the concept of occupation). 
 9. Adam Roberts, What is a Military Occupation?, 55 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 
249, 249 (1984); see, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW 
OF LAND WARFARE 139 (July 18, 1956) [hereinafter Army Field Manual 27-10]. 
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Regulations, offers a starting point for this inquiry.10 
A. THE BEGINNING OF MILITARY OCCUPATION 
Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations states that a 
“[t]erritory is considered occupied under international law when 
it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.11 
“The occupation extends only to the territory where such 
authority has been established and can be exercised.”12 Article 
42 determines that two conditions must be fulfilled for 
occupation to begin: (1) hostile troops must be physically located 
in the area so that the legitimate government is incapable of 
exercising effective powers of government; and (2) military 
troops must be capable of exercising effective powers of 
government over the occupied territory.13 The question of 
whether there is a formal recognition of occupation is merely a 
factual test that will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.14 
According to Article 42, occupation relies on an objective 
determination based on the actual submission of territory to the 
authority of hostile foreign armed forces and not on a subjective 
perception of the prevailing situation by the parties.15 
The first condition of Article 42 to constitute occupation is a 
preliminary condition for the second—i.e., the physical presence 
of troops must exist before effective governmental control can be 
 
 10. Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, arts. 42–43, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter 1907 
Hague Regulations]; see BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 56 (“The conditions that 
define when occupation begins also identify when it ends.”); Benvenisti, 
Unilateral Termination, supra note 7. 
 11. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 42. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.; see also GERHARD VON GLHAN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY 
TERRITORY: A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT 
OCCUPATION 28 (1957). 
 14. See DIETER FLECK, THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 274 (2d ed. 2008); see also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 166, ¶ 173 (Dec. 19); 
Trial of Wilhelm List and Others, Case No. 47, U.S. Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg, 8 LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIMS. 34, 55-56 (1948) [hereinafter 
Hostage Trial]; Adam Roberts, The End of Occupation: Iraq 2004, 54 INT’L 
COMP. L. Q. 27, 28 (2005); Nicholas Rostow, Gaza, Iraq, Lebanon: Three 
Occupations Under International Law, 37 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 205, 217–19 
(2007). 
 15. Tristan Ferraro, Determining the Beginning and End of an Occupation 
Under International Humanitarian Law, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 133, 135 
(2012). 
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achieved.16 
As follows, the second occupation condition of Article 42 is 
an examination of whether the occupying state has exercised 
authority over the territory. The text is ambiguous, however, 
and conflates the actual exercise of authority (“actually placed 
 
 16. Marten Zwanenburg, The Law of Occupation Revisited: The Beginning 
of an Occupation, 10 Y.B INT’L HUM. L. 99, 110 (2007). In 1863, The Lieber Code 
was issued to the Union Forces during the American Civil War. See FRANCIS 
LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED 
STATES IN THE FIELD (1898). Although the Lieber Code did not contain an 
explicit definition of “occupation,” it was the first legal instrument to imply that 
“occupation” meant actual physical presence of military troops on a foreign 
territory. Id. Physical military presence was also a condition for constituting 
occupation as part of later attempts to codify the laws of war by the 1874 
Brussels Declaration. Final Protocol of the Brussels Conference on the Rules of 
Military Warfare, art. 1, Aug. 27, 1874, 148 C.T.S. 133. It then included the 
same definition for occupation as it appears in the 1907 Hague regulations. 
Compare id., with 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 42. Although the 
1874 Brussels Declaration never entered into force as treaty law, it had an 
important influence on later treaties that were adopted. After parties failed to 
adopt the 1874 Brussels Declaration, the Institute of International Law adopted 
the Oxford Manual on the Laws of Wars on Land. OXFORD MANUAL ON THE 
LAWS OF WAR ON LAND (1880), reprinted in RESOLUTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (James Brown Scott ed., 1916) [hereinafter OXFORD 
MANUAL]. The 1880 Oxford Manual was a high-quality code that for the first 
time aimed to specify the law of war and included an explicit definition of the 
term “occupation.” Id. The manual contained three express requirements for the 
legal existence of occupation (Article 41): (1) occupation follows the invasion of 
hostile forces; (2) the state to which the territory belongs has ceased to exercise 
its ordinary authority as a result of the invasion; and (3) solely the invading 
state is in a position to maintain order over the occupied territory. Id. These 
three conditions clarified matters considerably. Yet, the 1880 Oxford Manual’s 
Article 41 was not clear on whether actual physical military presence was 
required to constitute a legal state of occupation. Id. The Institute of 
International Law encouraged European Governments to adopt the 1880 
Oxford Manual. Id.; see also Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with 
Occupation: Critical Examination of the Historical Development of the Law of 
Occupation, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 51, 60, 64 (2012); VON GLHAN, supra note 
13, at 9. The international legal community, however, continued to debate 
whether the physical presence of troops was necessary to trigger the law of 
occupation. Years later, in an attempt to revise the 1874 Brussels Declaration, 
that document’s original definition of military occupation formed the basis of 
discussion in The Hague International Conference. Hague Convention II 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 43, July 29, 1899, 32 
Stat. 1803, 1808, 1 Bevans 247, 251 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention]; 
DORIS APPEL GRABER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT 
OCCUPATION 1863-1914: A HISTORICAL SURVEY 30 (1949). The Second Hague 
Peace Conference of 1907 adopted, as is, the wording of 1899 Hague Convention 
that defined occupation. Its wording is similar to the original principles 
expressed in 1874 Brussels Declaration, emphasizing that physical military 
presence is an essential element for the beginning of occupation. See 1907 
Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 42. 
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under the authority;” “such authority has been established”) 
with the potential exercise of such authority (“can be 
exercised”).17 Although vaguely worded, Article 42 clearly 
forbids fictitious occupations and states that the element of 
control determines whether the law of occupation applies. 18 
The controversy surrounding the requisite level of effective 
control thus centers on two main approaches: (1) the potential 
nature of foreign military troops’ presence in the occupied 
territory; and (2) actual control. According to the first approach, 
which is more accepted, occupation requires both actual military 
presence and potential powers of government over the occupied 
territory.19 The second approach is more restrictive and requires 
not only the potential for an occupying state to control the 
territory, but also its actual exercise of such control. In this view, 
 
 17. Marten Zwanenburg, Michael Bothe & Marco Sassoli, Is the Law of 
Occupation Applicable to the Invasion Phase?, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 29, 31 
(2012). 
 18. See 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 42. Possession and 
administration are the two essential facts that constitute an effective 
occupation. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, VOL. 1 
PEACE 557-559 (1955). Possession means that the territory must really be taken 
under “its sway (corpus) with the intention of acquiring sovereignty over it 
(animus).” Id. After taking possession, the possessor must establish some kind 
of administration thereon that shows that the territory is really governed by 
the new possessor. Id. Since an occupation is established only if effective, it is 
obvious that the extent of an occupation ought to cover only so much territory 
as is effectively occupied. See Hostage Trial, supra note 13, at 56; see also 
MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 219 (1959); Ferraro, 
supra note 15, at 139–40; VON GLHAN, supra note 13, at 28–29. 
 19. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
adopted the first approach and has provided some guidelines for determining 
when occupation is taking place: (1) the occupying power must be in a position 
to substitute its own authority for that of the authorities; (2) the enemy’s forces 
must have surrendered, been defeated or withdrawn; (3) sufficient forces of the 
occupying state are present in the territory or can be sent within a reasonable 
time to establish authority; (4) a temporary administration has been 
established over the territory; and (5) the occupying power has issued and 
enforced directions to the local population. HCJ 102/82 Tsemel et. al. v. Minister 
of Defence 37 (3) P.D. 365 (1983) (Isr.) (stating that the Israeli HCJ also adopted 
the first approach of potential control of effective control required to constitute 
occupation); Prosecutor v. Naletilic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 217 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003); U.K. MIN. OF DEF., THE 
MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 273–307 (2004); CAN. OFF. OF JUDGE 
ADV. GEN., JOINT DOCTRINE MANUAL: LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE 
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVEL §§ 1202-03 (2001); COMMENTARY TO 
GENEVA CONVENTION IV RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS 
IN TIME OF WAR 179 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter PICTET COMMENTARY 
GC IV], http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC_1949-IV.pdf; Hostage 
Trial, supra note 14, at 55–56; Army Field Man. 27-10, supra note 9, at 139. 
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occupation begins only when the occupying power is actually 
exercising its authority over the territory.20 
When evaluating the beginning of occupation, determining 
whether the territory is in a situation of occupation or mere 
invasion is crucial.21 A distinction must also be made between a 
situation of occupation and a blockade or military pressure.22 As 
discussed, contemporary conflicts have added an additional 
layer of complexity. The most meaningful development in the 
 
 20. GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, VOL. 2: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
324 (1968) (arguing that the de facto element is indicative of the rule that actual 
effective control is a condition sine qua non of the law of occupation). “Only 
when, and where, the Occupying Power has attained unquestioned control does 
hostile territory become subject to the more exacting restraints of the law of 
belligerent occupation as compared with those of the laws of war in the strict 
sense.” Id.; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J 166, ¶ 173 (Dec. 19) (holding that, to recognize 
the existence of occupation, an actual effective control is required over the 
territory and it is not sufficient to recognize a potential for such control). See, 
e.g., VON GLHAN, supra note 13, at 28 (“Territory is considered occupied when 
it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army . . . . Thus there is 
assumed an invasion of the enemy state, resisted or unresisted, as a result of 
which the invader has rendered the enemy government incapable of publicly 
exercising its authority; the invader has successfully substitutes his own 
authority for that of the legitimate government in the territory invaded.”). 
 21. The definition of occupation in Article 42 of 1907 Hague Regulations 
distinguishes between “invasion” and “occupation,” although IHL does not 
provide an explicit definition for the term “invasion.” 1907 Hague Regulations, 
supra note 10, art. 42. Because of the unique and fluid experiences of each 
situation, it can be challenging to identify the precise moment when an invasion 
becomes an occupation. Id. In principle, the difference between an occupant and 
invader is that an occupant establishes an administration in a territory while 
an invader merely passes through the territory. Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo, (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J 
166, ¶ 178 (Dec. 19); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶¶ 89–
101 (July 9); MYERS S. MCDOUGAL & F.P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM 
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 
732-35 (1961); Kenneth Watkin, Use of Force During Occupation: Law 
Enforcement and Conduct of Hostilities, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 267, at 272–
73 (2012); GREENSPAN, supra note 18, at 213; Ferraro, supra note 15, at 135; 
Roberts, supra note 9, at 261; OXFORD MANUAL, supra note 16, art. 41; THE 
MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 19, § 11.3; Zwanenburg, 
supra note 16, at 108. For the debate among international law scholars over the 
distinction between invasion and occupation and whether an intermediate 
phase between the two exists until effective control over the territory is reached, 
see Zwanenburg, Bothe & Sassoli, supra note 17, at 29–50. 
 22. See Adam Roberts, Occupation, Military, Termination of, in MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW VOL. 7 930 (2011); VON 
GLHAN, supra note 13, at 29; Benvenisti, Unilateral Termination, supra note 7, 
at 373. 
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last few decades have been the use of air power, along with naval 
power and sophisticated military technology, to impose military 
pressure or blockades.23 Now it is certainly possible for a hostile 
power to police a territory with minimal reliance on forces 
physically present on the ground, relying instead on the use of 
advanced technology in the air and sea.24 The situations of 
invasion, blockade, military pressure, and belligerent occupation 
vary in multiple respects, including the physical presence of 
foreign military troops in foreign territory, the degree of effective 
control required for their establishment, and the different 
aspirations that the foreign forces hold in the specific situation.25 
Yet a military air or sea presence used to impose pressure or 
establish a blockade (constituting military aspirations short of 
occupation that fall under the laws of armed conflict) still does 
not invoke the law of belligerent occupation without the presence 
of military troops on the ground.26 This kind of “hovering” or 
“bordering” presence does not allow the occupying state to 
physically carry out its main responsibility according to Article 
43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations: to establish governmental 
control to ensure and restore public order and safety for the local 
population.27 The military strength of a foreign army located 
 
 23. Zwanenberg, supra note 16, at 106. 
 24. Eyal Benvenisti describes the situation of military power controlling air 
and naval territory as “virtual occupation”—modern armies’ remotely 
controlling foreign territory with advanced equipment to prevent a local 
government from functioning. Cf. BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 54 (“There would 
be situation where the virtual control over a foreign territory is so effective that 
the local government cannot function and provide for the inhabitants. In such 
cases there is a strong argument that a duty to occupy arise, the virtual 
occupant having to send in ground troops to establish the necessary 
infrastructure to restore and ensure public order and secure the human rights 
of the inhabitants.”); see Ferraro, supra note 15, at 143; Zwanenburg, supra note 
16, at 106, 126. 
 25. Cf. Benjamin Rubin, Disengagement from the Gaza Strip and Post-
Occupation Duties, 42 ISR. L. REV. 528, 538 (2009); SCHWARZENBERGER, supra 
note 20, at 177; Zwanenburg, supra note 16, at 130. 
 26. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT 
OCCUPATION 48 (2009); Hans-Peter Gasser, Belligerent Occupation, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW para. 527 (D. Fleck ed., 2d 
ed. 2008); VON GLHAN, supra note 13, at 28–29; Ferraro, supra note 15, at 145. 
 27. See 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 42–56. The recognition 
of an occupation holds vital implications for the occupying state according to the 
ensuing duties assigned by the law of belligerent occupation. The 1907 Hague 
Regulations determine the rights of occupying powers in the conduct of 
operations and limit the means of doing harm that is not compatible with 
military necessity. The Fourth Geneva Convention safeguards military 
personnel placed “hors de combat,” as well as people not taking part in 
hostilities. For the main duties of the occupying power, see id.; Additional 
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outside the borders of a state or area is not in itself sufficient to 
constitute effective control. What matters is a foreign power’s 
ability to establish effective control over civilian life within the 
occupied area and its capability of substituting its authority for 
that of the local government.28 
B. THE END OF MILITARY OCCUPATION AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 
As discussed, given the lack of a legal definition of 
belligerent occupation, the end of an occupation can be 
understood as the reversal or unwinding of its commencement.29 
That is, the termination of a military occupation is a reversal of 
the situation that constituted a military occupation of a 
sovereign state or territory in the first place, or a reversion to 
what existed before the occupation. Therefore, the common legal 
assumption is that an occupation ends when the elements 
essential for the commencement (and duration) of one—
including the physical presence of foreign forces, their ability to 
exercise effective control, and the lack of local government 
consent to their presence—cease to exist.30 
As complex as it is to answer the question of when a territory 
is considered occupied, it is even more complex to determine the 
end of occupation based on its beginning. The determination of 
whether effective control has been transferred or lost must be 
considered on a case-by-case basis.31 In many cases, however, 
 
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter AP1]; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 27–34, 47–
78, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva 
Convention]. 
 28. Council Decision 2008/901/CFSP of Dec. 2, 2008, Concerning an 
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, 
2008 O.J. (L 323/66); SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 20, at 174; VON GLHAN, 
supra note 13, at 28. See also ROBERT KOLB & SYLVAIN VITÉ, LE DROIT DE 
L’OCCUPATION MILITAIRE: PERSPECTIVES HISTORIQUES ET ENJEUX JURIDIQUES 
ACTUELS 143, 149 (2009); Kenneth Watkin, Use of Force During Occupation: 
Law Enforcement and Conduct of Hostilities, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 267, 299 
(2012); MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 21, at 732–35; Benvenisti, supra 
note 8, at 6; Roberts, supra note 9, at 300. 
 29. Shany, Faraway, supra note 7, at 359; Ferraro, supra note 15, at 156. 
 30. Id. at 156. 
 31. Benvenisti, Unilateral Termination, supra note 7, at 375–76. 
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the lapse of time between the cessation of fighting and the 
signing of an agreement ending the war blurs the precise point 
in time when occupation responsibilities commence and 
terminate.32 As discussed earlier, since establishing the Hague 
Regulations, some conditions, such as progressive phasing out, 
partial withdrawal, continued military presence on the basis of 
consent between the occupying power and the local government, 
maintenance of certain competences over the previously 
occupied area, or the evolution of the means of exercising 
effective control can complicate the legal classification of when 
an occupation has ended and duties are removed.33 
In general and straightforward circumstances, an 
occupation would be terminated at the actual dispossession of 
the territory (or part of it) by the occupying power, regardless 
the cause of the dispossession.34 According to scholars and 
international law bodies, the two widely accepted elements for 
defining the end of occupation are (1) the withdrawal of military 
forces from the territory; and (2) the loss of effective control over 
a territory or its transfer to a local power—that is, a legitimate 
government among the local population that is able to resume 
its authority and functions.35 Drawing solely on the various 
army manuals, it is difficult to elucidate any further common or 
consistent criteria for the end of an occupation beyond the 
elements already discussed in Article 42 of the 1907 Hague 
Regulations.36 The International Review of the Red Cross on 
 
 32. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET. NO. 27-161-2, INT’L L. V. II, 159–
61 (1962). 
 33. Ferraro, supra note 15, at 134. 
 34. VON GLHAN, supra note 13, at 29. 
 35. LASSA FRANCIS OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, VOL. 2 
DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY 436 (1952); DINSTEIN, supra note 26, at 272; 
GREENSPAN, supra note 17, at 219. See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 20, at 
317; Roberts, supra note 14, at 27. 
 36. It is accepted that military manuals might be valid evidence for state 
practice and might represent opinion juris, which would make them customary 
international law. But see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (5th ed. 1998). For the opposite opinion that military 
manuals are not necessarily an evidence of customary international law, see 
Nobou Hayashi, National Military Manuals on the Law of Armed Conflict, 
FICHL PUBLICATIONS SERIES NO. 2 1, 65 (2d ed. 2010), http://www.fichl.org/
fileadmin/fichl/documents/FICHL_2_Second_Edition_web.pdf. The French 
Army Manual does not include any specification regarding the end of 
occupation; it simply repeats the principles of Article 42 of the 1907 Hague 
Regulations for the constituting occupation. FR. MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE, 
MANUAL DE DROIT DES CONFLIT ARMÉS (2012), http://www.cicde.defense.
gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/20130226_np_cicde_manuel-dca.pdf. The German Army 
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Customary Law also fails to indicate any specific guidelines for 
the end of occupation.37 
Military withdrawal is a preliminary condition for clearly 
identifying the end of occupation, and much emphasis has been 
placed on it by international law bodies and in legal writing.38 
Just as occupation cannot begin without the presence of a hostile 
army, military withdrawal necessarily indicates that occupation 
has ended.39 This was, in fact, the recent decision of the 
 
Manual, although it emphasizes that “[o]ccupied territory does not include 
battle areas, i.e. areas which are still embattled and not subject to permanent 
occupational authority (area of invasion, withdrawal area). The general rules of 
international humanitarian law shall be applicable here.” GER. FEDERAL 
MINISTER OF DEFENCE, HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT – MANUAL ¶ 
528 (1992). The U.S. Army Manual also does not include explicit reference to 
the end of occupation but just emphasizes that: “Occupation = Invasion + Firm 
Control. The radius of occupation is determined by the effectiveness of control; 
occupation must be actual and effective.” U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT DESKBOOK III 122 (2012). Both the Canadian Army Manual and the 
Australian Army Manual include an explicit section for “termination of 
occupation” and detail the three ways occupation might end: (1) withdrawal 
from the territory; (2) ejection by force of the occupying power; and 
(3) annexation by the occupying power. The Australian Military Manual adds 
that valid legal annexation cannot occur while allies of the defeated sovereign 
nation are still in the field against the occupying power. OFFICE OF THE JUDGE 
ADVOCATE GENERAL, JOINT DOCTRINE MANUAL, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT 
THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS, B-GJ-005-104/FP-021, § 2, art. 1204 
(Aug. 13, 2001) (Can.); AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
§ 12.9 (2006). The United Kingdom’s military manual repeats the elements of 
military withdrawal and loss of effective control required for the end of 
occupation and elaborates: “11.7.1 The fact that some of the inhabitants are in 
a state of rebellion, or that guerrillas or resistance fighters have occasional 
successes, does not render the occupation at an end. Even a temporarily 
successful rebellion in part of the area under occupation does not necessarily 
terminate the occupation so long as the occupying power takes steps to deal 
with the rebellion and re-establish its authority or the area in question is 
surrounded and cut off. Whether or not a rebel movement has successfully 
terminated an occupation is a question of fact and degree depending on, for 
example, the extent of the area controlled by the movement and the length of time 
involved, the intensity of operations, and the extent to which the movement is 
internationally recognized.” UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JSP 383 THE JOINT 
SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT § 11.7.1 (2004) (emphasis 
added). 
 37. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the 
Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 175 (2005); Roberts, 
supra note 22, § 54, at 9. 
 38. VON GLHAN, supra note 13, at 29; Roberts, supra note 22, § 20, at 4. 
 39. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 562–63. Discussing the consequences of 
occupation, Oppenheim states that no other state can acquire an occupied 
territory unless the occupying power withdraws from it or has been successfully 
driven away by the local government without being able to re-occupy. This 
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European Court of Human Rights in its ruling on two cases 
regarding the aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Court held that the 
physical presence of foreign troops is a sine qua non requirement 
of occupation and that military occupation is inconceivable 
without “boots on the ground.”40 
The second indication that the law of occupation ceases to 
apply is the loss of effective control.41 A fair legal ramification of 
the end of occupation is when an occupying power loses effective 
control, local authority over the occupied territory will be 
restored, even if it is not restored fully.42 Yet in these situations 
it is equally unclear what level of effective control needs to be 
transferred to constitute the end of occupation. This is the “weak 
point” of the law of belligerent occupation, compounding the 
difficulties established by the lack of definition or standards for 
ending occupation. 
There are various ways to end an occupation, and military 
withdrawal and transfer of effective control can take different 
forms.43 The legal principle of the law of belligerent occupation 
assumes that the end of occupation is agreed-upon and includes 
a political arrangement or declaration, international treaties, 
international bodies’ resolutions, or political leaders’ statements 
that set the terms for military withdrawal and transfer of control 
to the local sovereign.44 All would normally include provisions 
regarding the form of local government in the territory, any 
security arrangements, commitments according to international 
treaties, and economic and cultural relations with other states 
taking part in the arrangement.45 
There are other ways of ending occupation, however, that do 
not involve the coordination of military withdrawal and transfer 
 
argument indicates that the existence of occupation, or vice versa—
termination—depends upon the physical presence of military forces or their 
withdrawal. Id. 
 40. Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 40167/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 28–29 (2015); 
Chiragov and Others v. Armenia, App. No. 13216/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 33–35 
(2015). 
 41. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 20, at 317.  
 42. YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION: CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND ITS INTERACTION WITH 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 16 (2009); Benvenisti, Unilateral 
Termination, supra note 7, at 371. 
 43. Roberts, supra note 22, § 20, at 4. 
 44. Id. 
 45. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 20, at 172; Roberts, supra note 22, § 19, 
at 4. 
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of effective control. For example, the ousted local government 
might reinstate control over the territory by its legitimate armed 
forces or its allies in the area; the local population might set the 
territory free through uprisings and ultimately establish its own 
local government; the occupying power might take unilateral 
steps; or the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council (U.N. 
Security Council) might issue a binding resolution.46 
The varied ways of ending an occupation bring forward a 
customary principle in international law that occupation should 
be terminated based on consent of the states involved, 
international norms and institutions, and the legitimacy of the 
local population.47 Annexation is illegal according to customary 
international law; in this scenario there is a customary 
obligation to negotiate in good faith in an attempt to end any 
occupation.48 
In situations where occupations end, state practice has been 
far from uniform; it can hardly fill in the blanks where legal 
instruments fail to set clear rules for cases where the end of 
occupation is not a defined, clear-cut moment concluded by peace 
agreement or treaty. For example, there are circumstances in 
which an occupation is widely accepted as terminated despite 
the fact that the intervening force remains in the territory, as 
with the United States military’s occupation of Japan and the 
end of the Allied occupation of West Germany.49 In these cases, 
 
 46. ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 42, at 150–51; Benvenisti, Unilateral 
Termination, supra note 7, at 371; Roberts, supra note 22, § 18, at 4; VON 
GLHAN, supra note 13, at 257. 
 47. Roberts, supra note 22, § 55, at 9–10. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Roberts, supra note 14, at 29; Security Treaty, Japan-U.S., art. 6(a), 
Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3329 (“All occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be 
withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible after the coming into force of the 
present Treaty, and in any case not later than 90 days thereafter. Nothing in 
this provision shall, however, prevent the stationing or retention of foreign 
armed forces in Japanese territory under or in consequence of any bilateral or 
multilateral agreements which have been or may be made between one or more 
of the Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Japan on the other.”). With regards 
to the allied occupation of West Germany, the original text of the Paris 
Agreements, in particular Protocol I, states that occupation ended while allied 
forces remained in the territory. Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation 
Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany (with Schedule of amendments), 
Oct. 23, 1954, 331 U.N.T.S. 253; Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect 
to Germany with Agreed Minute, art. 7, Sept. 20, 1990, 1696 U.N.T.S. 115 (“(1) 
The French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of 
America hereby terminate their rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin 
and to Germany as a whole. As a result, the corresponding, related 
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foreign forces remained in the territory after occupation’s end 
with the consent of local government and as a result of an 
agreement between the parties.50 In 2004, the U.N. Security 
Council recognized the end of the United States-led occupation 
of Iraq despite the fact that military troops remained in the 
territory of Iraq until 2011, retaining a substantive level of 
control over the territory.51 The continued presence of the 
occupying powers in Iraq after the stated end of occupation was 
not accompanied by a security treaty, as was the case in 
Germany and Japan post World War II.52 
The case of Afghanistan is another example of military 
troops remaining in a former occupied territory, although in this 
case the occupation was never formally recognized and the law 
 
quadripartite agreements, decisions and practices are terminated and all 
related Four Power institutions are dissolved. (2) The United Germany shall 
have accordingly full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs.”); 
Roberts, supra note 14, at 29. 
 50. DINSTEIN, supra note 26, at 270; Benvenisti, Unilateral Termination, 
supra note 7, at 371-82. 
 51. The presence of United States-led forces after the end of occupation was 
ratified by an agreement with the local temporary government. Although the 
presence of military troops in Iraq lasted nine years after the Security Council 
adopted a resolution declaring the end of United States-led forces occupation of 
Iraq, and the United States-led forces military presence was based on the 
explicit consent of the local Iraqi government and on particular agreements, it 
remains true that the United States-led coalition retained significant effective 
control and was highly involved in combat operations. It was possible because 
the Security Council Resolution recognized the end of occupation in Iraq and 
consequently the application of the law of belligerent occupation and authorized 
the ongoing presence of United States-led forces in territory. Not only did the 
occupying powers in Iraq retain external security control after the conclusion of 
occupation, as in the case of Japan and Germany, but also they also retained 
administrative and internal security authorities. See S.C. Res. 1546 (June 8, 
2004) (“Welcoming the beginning of a new phase in Iraq’s transition to a 
democratically elected government, and looking forward to the end of the 
occupation and the assumption of full responsibility and authority by a fully 
sovereign and independent Interim Government of Iraq by 30 June 2004.”). See 
also ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 42, at 20; DINSTEIN, supra note 26, at 273. 
 52. Agreement On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and 
the Organization of Their Activities During Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, 
Iraq-U.S., Nov. 17, 2008, T.I.A.S. No. 09-101.1 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122074.pdf (stating that the 
Iraq-U.S. agreement was reached years after the stated end of occupation); 
Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and 
Cooperation, Iraq-U.S., Nov. 17, 2008, T.I.A.S. No. 09-101.1, http://www.usf-
iraq.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/security-agreement-2.pdf. See also 
Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and 
Friendship, Iraq-U.S., Aug. 27, 2007 (no longer in force), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/11/print/20071126-11.html. 
2018] POST-OCCUPATION OBLIGATIONS 23 
of belligerent occupation did not technically apply.53 Following 
the end of the unrecognized occupation, foreign troops continue 
to exercise some effective control similar to the control exercised 
during occupation to stabilize the country’s regime and run 
counter-insurgency operations (including policing functions).54 
Their stay, however, is acceptable to the legitimate local 
government, and the foreign presence is therefore no longer 
considered to be akin to an occupying power with obligations 
according to the law of belligerent occupation. The pertinent 
question is whether the consent between the parties to the 
ongoing presence of the former occupying power in the territory 
would negate the requirements of the law of belligerent 
occupation, if occupation had been formally declared.55 
State practice was also notably inconsistent in the case of 
the unilateral action taken by Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 
 
 53. United States-led forces launched campaigns against the Taliban 
regime starting on October 6, 2001, and lasting throughout the occupation of 
Afghanistan. There is no consensus among legal authorities as to when exactly 
this occupation ended. The view of the ICRC was that the occupation of United 
States-led forces ended with the establishment of the Afghan transitional 
government in June 19, 2002. International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism: 
Questions and Answers, ICRC (Jan. 1, 2011), https://www.icrc.org/eng/
resources/documents/faq/terrorism-faq-050504.htm. For legal analysis of the 
Afghanistan conflict, see ELIZABETH WILMSHURST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 242-79 (2012); A. Bellal, G. Giacca & S. 
Casey-Maslen, International Law and Armed Non-State Actors in Afghanistan, 
93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 52 (2011). 
 54. S.C. Res. 1510, art. 1 (Oct. 13, 2003) (“Authorizes expansion of the 
mandate of the International Security Assistance Force to allow it, as resources 
permit, to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the 
maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its 
environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United 
Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in 
reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, 
and to provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support 
of the Bonn Agreement.”). S.C Res. 1386, art. 1 (Dec. 20, 2001) (“Authorizes, as 
envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement, the establishment for 6 months 
of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim 
Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, 
so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United 
Nations can operate in a secure environment.”). See also Enduring Strategic 
Partnership Agreement, Afg.-U.S., May 2, 2012, T.I.A.S. No. 12-704, 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/196855.pdf.; President, George 
W. Bush, The President’s News Conference With President Hamid Karzai of 
Afghanistan (May 23, 2005), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.
php?pid=73643; Mark Landler, U.S. Troops to Leave Afghanistan by the End of 
2016, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/
world/asia/us-to-complete-afghan-pullout-by-end-of-2016-obama-to-say.html. 
 55. Roberts, supra note 22, § 27, at 5. 
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2005, which involved the evacuation of all Israeli settlements 
and military forces from the territory without coordination with 
the local government and the international community.56 In the 
 
 56. On June 6, 2004, Israel’s Cabinet adopted a resolution regarding the 
Disengagement Plan from Gaza and the northern West Bank. As to Gaza, the 
Cabinet’s decision was as follows: 
1) The State of Israel will evacuate the Gaza Strip, including all 
existing Israeli towns and villages, and will redeploy outside the Strip. 
This will not include military deployment in the area of the border 
between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (“the Philadelphi Route”) as 
detailed below. 
2) Upon completion of this process, there shall no longer be any 
permanent presence of Israeli security forces in the areas of Gaza Strip 
territory which have been evacuated. 
Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan art. 3.1, June 6, 2004, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/mfadocuments/pages/revised%2
0disengagement%20plan%206-june-2004.aspx. 
On September 12, 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza and evacuated 
all Israeli settlements within Gaza while retaining control over the air, sea, and 
land passages of persons and goods into Gaza from Israel. Following the 
withdrawal of all military forces, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) commander 
in Gaza signed a declaration terminating the military administration 
operations in the territory. Manifest Regarding Termination of Military Rule 
(Manifest No. 6) (Gaza Region) 5765-2005. See also Press Release, IDF 
Spokesman, Exit of IDF Forces from the Gaza Strip Completed, (Sept. 12, 2005), 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2005/pages/exit%20of%20idf%20forces%
20from%20the%20gaza%20strip%20completed%2012-sep-2005.aspx (“Tonight, 
September 12, 2005 the Head of the Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Dan Harel 
signed a declaration stating the end of military rule in the Gaza Strip. This 
follows the evacuation of all IDF forces from the region and the handing over of 
control of the region to the Palestinian Authority; in accordance with the 
decision of the Israeli Government. This declaration annuls the declaration 
signed June 6, 1967 by the former Head of the Southern Command, Maj. Gen. 
Yishayahu Gavish declaring the start of military rule in the area. This is the 
final legislative act taken by an IDF commander in the Gaza Strip after 38 years 
of IDF presence in the region.”). In an attempt to achieve international 
recognition for the end of its responsibility, Israel surrendered its complete 
control over Gaza by signing the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) 
with the Palestinian Authority (PA). Agreement On Movement and Access and 
Agreed Principles for the Rafah Crossing, Isr.-P.A., Nov. 17, 2005, 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/2005/87237.htm. 
In June 2007, Hamas gained control over Gaza and since then has operated all 
governmental authorities in the area. For Israel’s official standpoint that its 
effective control over Gaza ended after its 2005 withdrawal, see TURKEL 
COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE PUBLIC COMMISSION TO EXAMINE THE MARITIME 
INCIDENT OF 31 MAY 2010 28 (2010), http://www.turkel-committee.com/files/
wordocs//8707200211english.pdf. 
For the international community’s standpoint that Israel remains an occupying 
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Res. 1860 (Jan. 8, 2009); Human Rights Council, Rep. of the United Nations 
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absence of coordination, and without any practice or standards 
that would encourage such coordination, the end of occupation 
was not formally recognized. That does not mean, however, that 
Israel continues to or even has the practical ability to carry out 
duties according to the law of belligerent occupation, mainly 
because it has no military troops on the ground, and the local 
government has been exercising governmental control since 
1993.57 However, since Hamas took over governmental authority 
in the Gaza Strip in 2007, the result is that the territory has 
been left in some aspects without responsible formal power; 
while Israel no longer performs duties according the law of 
belligerent occupation, the local government is unwilling to 
independently maintain all necessary governmental authorities 
for the local population.58 
The international community and the U.N. play a major role 
in setting principles and recognizing the end of an occupation 
when the terms are not finalized in a peace agreement or 
treaty.59 Unfortunately, in many historical cases, the U.N. 
refrained from recognizing occupations in the first place and left 
the events unanswered.60 As mentioned, only two cases exist 
where the law of belligerent occupation was invoked and 
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 60. FLECK, supra note 14, at 276. For example, the Soviet presence in 
Afghanistan from 1979-1989; the United States invasion and occupation of 
Grenada in 1983 and of Panama in 1989; and the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 
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adhered to by an occupying state: the Coalition forces’ presence 
in Iraq in 2003 and Israel’s in Gaza and the West Bank since 
1967.61 
The current case of Cyprus and Turkey presents a relevant 
example for the role the international community plays in 
setting principles for occupation and its end. In general, 
Turkey’s long-term occupation of Northern Cyprus and its 
accordance with international law have attracted little attention 
from the international community.62 During the first years of the 
occupation, only non-binding U.N. General Assembly resolutions 
called for respect of the right of refugees to return and to 
repossess the property they owned.63 After a number of failed 
attempts, the Secretary General appointed a Special Adviser on 
Cyprus in 2014 to assist the parties in the conduct of 
negotiations aimed at reaching a comprehensive agreement.64 
Since 2014, however, no major negotiation efforts have been 
taken and the occupation is still unresolved. 
Russia’s activities in Georgia and Crimea also explicate the 
inconsistent treatment of occupations versus territorial 
annexations by the U.N. and the international community. In 
2008, Russia occupied significant undisputed areas in Georgia 
as part of the conflict over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, creating 
a buffer zone under the full control of its forces.65 None of the 
U.N. bodies have recognized the situation as either annexation 
or occupation, despite the fact that the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the European Union and the European Union Independent 
International Fact Finding Mission did.66 According to Russia, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not occupied territories but 
independent states.67 However, no international or domestic 
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legal act can justify the Russian military invasion of the 
sovereign territory of Georgia, or the recognition of the self-
proclaimed independence of Georgian separatist regions by 
Russia.68 It is obvious that Russia intends to annex these 
territories—an illegal act according to international law that 
should be treated accordingly by the international community.69 
In 2014, Russia also occupied Crimea in an attempt to effect 
annexation. Following the occupation, Crimea and Sevastopol 
held referenda on the question of whether to join the Russian 
Federation, yet it was widely suspected that these referenda 
were conducted not by locals, but by pro-Russian authorities.70 
To date, only Russia and four other U.N. members—
Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Syria—have 
recognized the validity of the referenda.71 The General Assembly 
adopted a non-binding resolution considering the referenda as 
non-binding and reaffirming Ukraine’s territorial integrity.72 
However, until very recently, neither the U.N. nor the 
international community had recognized Russia as an occupying 
state in Crimea.73 On December 19, 2016, the U.N. General 
Assembly passed a resolution that declared Russia an 
“occupying power” in Crimea and recognized Crimea as 
“temporarily occupied” by Russia.74 
The varied reactions of the international community to 
these events reveal the inconsistency in its own standards with 
respect to ending occupation. Such inconsistency reflects the 
political interests and aspirations behind each case, rather than 
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the exercise of measured, pragmatic treatment according to 
coherent legal standards. 
III. WEAKNESSES OF THE TRADITIONAL LEGAL 
PARADIGM OF THE END OF OCCUPATION 
A. THE LEGAL PARADIGM OF THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT 
OCCUPATION 
As mentioned, it is well established in the law of occupation 
that the transition from belligerent occupation to territorial 
sovereignty regained must be considered with respect to three 
different actors: the departing occupier, the returning legitimate 
sovereign, and the affected civilian population.75 It is also 
accepted that when occupation begins and the occupying power 
is subject to the rules of the law of belligerent occupation, it acts 
under two fundamental legal principles that have been in effect 
since the 19th century.76 The first is the protection of the 
occupied civilian population by, inter alia, ensuring and 
restoring its public order, security, and essential needs as much 
as possible.77 This first principle of civilian protection has been 
grounded in international humanitarian law ever since the 
adoption of the Preamble of the 1899 Hague Regulations. This 
Article, commonly called The Martens Clause, states that 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) protects civilians and 
belligerents, even in situations arising from armed conflict that 
were not anticipated by specific treaty provisions.78 Since the 
initial adoption of the 1899 Hague Regulations, the wording of 
the preamble has appeared in every major humanitarian treaty, 
including the 1907 Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva 
Convention.79 This clause was defined by the Nuremburg Trials 
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as the “legal yardstick” that every military act not governed by 
specific provisions must be judged upon.80 In its Advisory 
Opinion on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that the Marten 
Clause protects civilian populations, emphasizing its relevancy 
as an integral part of IHL, regardless of subsequent 
developments in military technology.81 
The second principle that the occupying power is subject to 
under the law of occupation is ensuring the “temporary” nature 
of occupation. The means, governance by the occupying state is 
colored by the expectation of the eventual return of the 
legitimate (even if temporarily ousted) sovereign to its 
preexisting right and responsibilities of governance of the 
occupied territory and its civilian population.82 This second 
principle that occupation is a time-limited state of affairs, not 
amounting to sovereignty and pending a peace agreement, is 
exemplified in the law of belligerent occupation by three aspects: 
(1) the prohibition of annexation, firmly established in the 
customary law;83 (2) rules regarding the occupier’s structure of 
authority during occupation;84 and (3) rules regarding the 
maintenance of existing legislation in the occupied territory.85 
Whatever the driving force, the rules governing the end of 
occupation (postliminium) signal restoration of the legal status 
quo before the belligerent occupation (as opposed to uti 
possidetis, which signifies the maintenance of the status quo).86 
Postliminium means that the legitimate sovereign 
automatically reassumes full authority and responsibility for the 
former occupied territory with the termination of its 
occupation.87 From the point of view of the occupying power, an 
alternate meaning of the end of occupation according to the IHL 
paradigm is that the occupying state’s responsibilities are 
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automatically alleviated.88 The law of occupation assumes that 
this is a defined moment when full compatibility exists between 
the transfer of effective control from the occupying power to the 
local, legitimate sovereign and reversion to the latter’s rights 
and obligations of sovereignty. One withdraws from governance, 
and the other enters to carry it forward. 
The cleanest situation of this “handover” is when occupation 
and the conflict come to an end simultaneously through a peace 
agreement or similar instrument. However, even under the 
traditional law of occupation, occupations often come to end in 
the midst of an armed conflict that continues apace. German 
forces occupying parts of France in World War II, for example, 
were forced to withdraw as part of a general retreat that was far 
from the end of the war itself.89 The general paradigm of the law 
of occupation, even in cases where the conflict itself does not end, 
is that the withdrawal of the enemy’s occupying forces provides 
the opening for the legitimate sovereign to return and take up 
its rights and obligations of sovereignty. 
B. PARADIGMATIC WEAKNESSES OF THE LAW OF 
BELLIGERENT IN CONTEMPORARY SITUATIONS OF 
OCCUPATION 
While the binary model of the law of belligerent occupation 
has the merit of clarity with respect to sovereignty and 
governance, it nonetheless has at least three weaknesses from 
the standpoint of the fundamental policies underlying it. The 
first is the concept of “effective control” in occupation. Effective 
control is defined as the ability of the occupier to exercise 
governmental control, stepping into the shoes of the ousted 
sovereign for a limited time period.90 The presence of hostile 
troops in the territory is essential. For example, in a world where 
the ability to remotely, “constructively occupy” a territory 
through advanced technology exists, such “occupation” is still 
merely influencing the government and does not constitute true 
effective control. The ambiguous language that allows legal 
analysis to view effective control as a separate element from 
military presence on the ground in determining occupation 
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neglects its core, intended meaning.91 
The binary approach to occupation, whether beginning or 
end, admirably respects sovereignty and governance of the 
legitimate sovereign through the principle of temporality. But, 
this approach causes one to view occupation in a vacuum. A 
second weakness is manifested in how the possibility that the 
inability or unwillingness of the legitimate sovereign to take 
over the functions of governance (particularly when the occupier 
has withdrawn and given up its rights and obligations as 
occupier) is left open, exposing the civilian population to 
humanitarian or other risks. The binary model of the law of 
occupation, in other words, assumes a sovereign that is able and 
willing (after, perhaps, some negotiated period of transition and 
handover) to revert to its rights and obligations of governance. 
This may not always be the case, and if so, the civilian 
population can find itself at risk through a vacuum of 
governance authority. 
The third weakness emerges in the many contemporary 
conflict and end-of-occupation scenarios that simply do not fit 
this tidy binary model.92 These include situations of civil war or 
strife occurring alongside the conflict that led to occupation; 
situations in which no one admits to being either the occupier or, 
in some conditions, an “ousted” legitimate sovereign, and, hence, 
no party admits to any obligations toward the civilian 
population; situations of humanitarian intervention or the 
“responsibility to protect;” or situations in which an 
international body (i.e., the U.N. Security Council) has endorsed 
armed intervention resulting not merely in a new 
administration invested with the country’s sovereignty, but a 
fundamental change in the nature of governance.93 In this final 
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case, what began as an “occupation” under the law of belligerent 
occupation could be successively transformed into a quasi-
trusteeship under the blessing of international organizations, 
eventually enabling the establishment of a fully recognized 
sovereign. In this scenario, any remaining foreign forces are 
present by sovereign consent. 
When the traditional law of occupation was first conceived, 
occupations were a hostile army’s strategic tool in the quest for 
victory. Belligerent occupation was not—and is not today, 
despite a greater emphasis on civilian protection—a neutral 
institution designed to create a zone of stability to protect 
civilians.94 As such, control of territory is legally permitted 
through the presence of a hostile state’s troops, for reasons of 
military necessity.95 The occupying state is allowed to privilege 
its military security needs while protecting the local population 
and the territory’s (ultimate) sovereignty as much as possible.96 
In other words, the rules of belligerent occupation remain the 
same. The strategic goal of many (though not necessarily all) 
contemporary occupations, by contrast, is not to gain territory, 
whether for reasons of outright conquest or as a matter of 
military necessity. In some cases, the objective of the occupation 
is not to fight another state, but to fight non-state actors acting 
within states located far away from the occupying power that are 
considered a security threat to one or more states (e.g. Taliban 
and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Hezbollah in Southern 
Lebanon).97 
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In other circumstances, the objective of military action 
leading to occupation by foreign forces is to end a regime by 
installing a new government as a means to end or prevent mass 
atrocities and human rights abuses, as was the case of the 2011 
intervention in Libya.98 Occupation may aim to prevent crimes 
against humanity, genocide, or mass atrocities and ethnic 
cleansing, by separating a territory from the security control of 
the central government, as with North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO)’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo.99 Such 
action may take place under the authority of the U.N. Security 
Council (e.g., East Timor), under the authority of a regional 
security alliance (e.g., NATO in Kosovo), or it may take place 
unilaterally, as with the United States invasion of Iraq in 
2003.100 Military action could also take the form of an invasion 
and occupation of sovereign territory by foreign forces on the 
grounds of protecting an ethnic minority that is the same as the 
invading state’s ethnicity, or to protect the “self-determination” 
of such an ethnic or linguistic minority. These justifications were 
offered by Russia for its entry into Crimea in 2014, even as it 
also denied that its forces were in fact present in the conflict, let 
alone enacting an “occupation.”101 
In characterizing the main features of contemporary 
conflicts that do not fit the legal paradigm of the end of military 
occupation, it can be stressed that these are situations where 
ending occupation is a process and not a specific moment, and/or 
situations where peace or the end of conflict is not the obvious 
precondition to, or consequence of, the end of occupation. 
These contemporary situations matter to the analysis of 
occupation law because most (if not all) of them feature a party 
to the conflict which departs sharply from the law of occupation’s 
fundamental legal principles of temporality and 
acknowledgment of reversion to the legitimate sovereign, or the 
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principle of minimal intervention of the occupying power in the 
administration of the local population.102 
1. Transformative Occupation 
Transformative occupation is a good example where the 
aforementioned binary structure is ill-suited, disrupting the 
balance of two of the fundamental principles of the law of 
occupation—civilian protection and temporality.103 
Contemporary transformative occupations are often perceived 
as situations where “good” occupying states take control over 
“bad” regimes.104 As noted, this is inconsistent at best with the 
historical assumption of the law of occupation that aims to avoid 
judging whether the occupiers are the “good” actors and the 
ousted sovereign the “bad” actor. Such law supports reversion to 
the ousted, yet legitimate sovereign.105 If anything, the Fourth 
Geneva Convention is suspicious of occupation becoming a form 
of annexation—as in the case of Nazi Germany in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union.106 There is little doubt, however, 
that the 1949 drafters were fully cognizant of the 
paradigmatically “transformative occupations” of Germany and 
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Japan.107 
Transformative occupation is characterized in today’s world 
by the lack of territorial aspiration from the occupying states 
and acceptance of duties with respect to the civilian population’s 
needs as a result of regime change.108 The explicit goals are often 
to change states that have failed or are existing under tyrannical 
rule.109 A number of examples, including the aftermath of World 
War II and Iraq since 2003, show that transformative political 
objectives can sometimes arise in occupations or in situations 
resembling occupation (as in the U.N.’s administration of post-
conflict territory).110 As occupying forces have engaged in armed 
conflict with jus ad bellum aims that essentially alter the nature 
of the legitimate sovereign to which the territory is supposed to 
revert (including abolishing it as a government, or perhaps 
banishing it from the occupied territory), these forces have 
covered increasingly extensive areas of administration over the 
occupied civilian population. If a war’s aim is to put boots on the 
ground to end a regime and quite possibly make a change in its 
political character (establishing democratic governance, for 
example), the presence of forces and their security may well 
require occupation for some period (as in the case of the United 
States in Iraq), and concomitantly, greater responsibility for 
civilian needs and administration.111 One could question the 
ability of the law of occupation in its traditional sense to 
successfully navigate contemporary situations in which the 
meaning of its fundamental principles (protection of local 
population and temporality) seem unavoidably under stress. 
Occupations aimed at regime change usually contain 
transitional periods that run from the end of occupation through 
the restoration of a new government invested with 
sovereignty.112 Exactly how these transformative occupations 
proceed, however, is variable. The end of occupation in such 
situations is not a moment in time but a gradual evolution of 
both the authority of local government and its acquisition of 
legitimacy with the local population.113 
In addition, the lines between war and peace are blurred 
 
 107. Id. at 601–03. 
 108. BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 275. 
 109. Roberts, supra note 85, at 580. 
 110. Id. at 581. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See supra notes 47–52. 
 113. BENVENISTI, supra note 2, at 255. 
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when occupation is not strictly a security measure in the midst 
of an interstate war. Whereas war often contains clear, long-
term goals for the parties, peace agreements or other 
instruments that aim to settle a conflict are not necessarily 
relevant to the end of many contemporary occupations.114 After 
all, in transformative conflicts and occupations featuring regime 
change, there is no longer a “hostile” sovereign party to reach 
peace with; there may instead be a newly installed interim 
government, existing with or without international approval, 
with which the occupier can sign an agreement giving consent to 
the presence of its forces.115 Such legal processes are simply not 
what the law of occupation contemplates as constituting 
agreements to end the conflict or to end the occupation 
administration and return the occupied territory to its ongoing, 
legitimate—even if losing—sovereign. 
Transformative conflict in the post-Cold War period has 
typically not been governed by appeal to the law of belligerent 
occupation but instead by other bodies of law, particularly the 
Resolutions of the Security Council. The 2003 United States-led 
forces’ invasion and occupation of Iraq, a case where a state 
admitted that it was an occupier under the law of occupation, is 
the exception, not the rule. In Kosovo and East Timor, for 
example, the circumstances of international politics and 
diplomacy removed transformative conflicts from the purview of 
the law of occupation to other structures of international law and 
institutions, including the Security Council.116 This rendered it 
unnecessary to acknowledge the ways in which the law of 
occupation failed to address such situations.117 
 
 114. Gabriella Blum, The Fog of Victory, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 391, 391–421 
(2013); Rostow, supra note 14, at 219. 
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2. Lengthy Occupation 
Beyond transformative occupation, cases of continuing, 
lengthy occupation, particularly in geographically adjacent 
territories, offer another reason for some commentators to 
question the relevance of the law of occupation as an adequate 
paradigm in contemporary conflicts.118 Despite the definition 
and normative principle of occupation as always and necessarily 
a temporary measure, since 1945, several occupations have 
persisted long after hostilities ceased. These cases include 
Israel’s control over Gaza and the West Bank, Turkey’s control 
over Northern Cyprus, Morocco’s control over Western Sahara, 
Indonesia’s control over East Timor and South Africa’s control 
over Namibia.119 The main problem with prolonged occupation 
is eventual dependency on the occupying state by the local 
population. Dependency is manifested, as noted in the example 
of Gaza, through services the occupying state provides to the 
local population in the occupied territory, including 
transportation, education, health services, financial services, 
infrastructure, employment options, etc.120 Disconnecting and 
“unwinding” such a long-standing dependence will often require 
considerable time, and in many cases, the process requires a 
significant transitional period of transferring power to local 
authorities.121 During this period, from the end of occupation 
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until full restoration of local authority, the local population is at 
risk of being left unprotected. 
3. Unilateral Termination of Occupation 
Unilateral conflict management is intended to persuade the 
other side to refrain, restrain or even end violence through the 
adoption of unilateral strategies.122 One of these is a separation 
strategy—unilateral disengagement—where one side leaves a 
disputed area in order to bring about the termination of a conflict 
or to reduce it by eliminating one of its motivating sources.123 
Contemporary cases where occupying states decide to 
unilaterally terminate their involvement by withdrawing their 
forces, thereby ending their effective control, further question 
the contemporary relevance of the law of occupation. In the 
absence of a peace agreement or mutually negotiated 
“handover,” if the ousted legitimate sovereign does not 
effectively take on governance obligations, unilateral 
withdrawal risks leaving the local population alone to deal with 
the challenge of rebuilding public order and safety.124 In 
discussing unilateral termination, observers sometimes point to 
two salient cases: Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Southern 
Lebanon in 2000 and its unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza 
Strip in 2005.125 Although Israel decided to end the occupation 
unilaterally in both of these scenarios, they unfolded quite 
differently, mainly with respect to a vacuum in governance, a 
trigger for applying any post-occupation obligations with respect 
to providing public order. Unlike the case of Gaza, Israel’s 
unilateral withdrawal from South Lebanon was coordinated 
with the international community, and the Security Council 
issued a formal resolution recognizing the end of this 
occupation.126 In these two cases, unilateral disengagement 
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failed to end the conflict but enabled its management without 
forces remaining on the ground.127 
The law of occupation has not developed sufficiently to 
respond to ambiguous situations where it is not clear who has 
the rights and duties of governance.128 Occupying forces may 
leave, yet sometimes the local government of the occupied 
territory or the returning sovereign cannot independently 
perform all the activities required to ensure safety and pubic 
order for the local population. Although there are situations in 
which international organizations step in to play this role—in 
transformative occupations, for example—this is not always the 
case.129 It might be said, however, that the problem is not that 
the law of occupation is inadequate to the task; it is rather that 
its rules quite deliberately privilege the principle of temporality 
for protecting sovereignty over the civilian protection principle 
in this circumstance.130 Faced with the possibility of a failure of 
governance for civilians, or creating rules that might be seen to 
justify the continued presence of Nazi Germany’s troops in an 
Eastern European country during World War II, one could point 
out that the rules comprehend the dilemma and make a 
deliberate choice (hence this bias is a “feature,” not a “bug”). Yet 
in contemporary times, over half a century beyond the drafting 
of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, these inadequacies have 
created complexities on the ground where the duties and 
obligations of the various international actors are insufficiently 
identified.131 
This legal gap is, in fact, a source of significant practical 
dilemmas today. In the case of Gaza, for instance, there have 
been serious electricity shortages.132 Israel is no longer an 
 
percent of the Lebanese territory as security zone, which included around 
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occupying power in Gaza and, as a result, does not carry ongoing 
obligations for its population’s public order and safety (apart 
from obligations imposed by Israeli High Court decisions for 
required humanitarian needs).133 The Palestinian Authority 
exerted de-facto control over the territory beginning in 1993.134 
Since 2007, it no longer controls the territory and its 
replacement, Hamas, has hijacked the infrastructure for its own 
purposes.135 Hamas is engaged in an ongoing armed conflict 
against Israel and prefers to employ its electricity to 
manufacture rockets instead of distributing it to the local 
population.136 Additionally, in retaliation for ongoing attacks 
against its citizens, Israel has attacked Gaza’s electric 
infrastructure and reduced its power supply.137 Although Gaza 
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has been essentially neglected with regard to governance for 
many years, political considerations appear to have prevented 
the parties involved and the international community from 
recognizing that formal occupation ended in Gaza when Israel 
withdrew its forces.138 Governance responsibilities 
correspondingly have reverted back to the status quo ante. If one 
accepts the legal analysis that military presence is a necessity 
for establishing occupation, the legal conclusion is sound. The 
consequence, however, is territory that lacks essential services 
for the local population. 
This deep tension between the principles, temporality and 
civilian protection, while evident in such contemporary 
occupations as Israel and Gaza, is far less visible in recent 
transformative occupations where the international community 
has taken on a role beyond the occupier and returning sovereign. 
In these situations, authoritative international bodies, such as 
the U.N. Security Council are able to bridge the gap, at least as 
a legal matter, between the actions of the former occupier and 
the actions of the “legitimate sovereign.”139 But in situations that 
lack this kind of legitimacy and international authority, there is 
a distinct possibility that under the law of occupation, there is 
no viable legal framework for concluding an occupation in ways 
that fully ensure the protection of the civilian population.140 The 
flawed assumption of the law of belligerent occupation, creating 
its significant weakness, is that there will always be a returning 
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sovereign to prevent a lengthy vacuum of authority. 
IV. THE EXISTING LAW OF BELLIGERENT 
OCCUPATION DOES NOT CREATE POST-
OCCUPATION OBLIGATIONS 
Ending contemporary conflicts ill-suited to the legal 
paradigm of the law of occupation can jeopardize the safety of 
the civilian population, prompting inquiry into whether the law 
of belligerent occupation imposes continuing duties on a former 
occupier. Although the binary model works to carry out the 
temporality principle, we have ample evidence as to how it could 
be less effective with respect to the civilian protection principle 
of the law.141 
The reality of situations like Gaza and Iraq, two prominent 
cases where the law of occupation was applied, has ignited the 
need to look for legal principles tailored for a transitional stage 
in many contemporary conflicts. Both cases have left open 
questions regarding “effective control” and the factual basis for 
the end of occupation, along with the post-occupation obligations 
of the former occupying states to ensure that territory is not left 
ungoverned in the aftermath. 
A. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF POST-OCCUPATION DUTIES WITHIN 
THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 
Since the post-World War II era, scholarship on issues of 
post-occupation has focused on the effectiveness of decisions 
made by the occupying state during the period of its control. 
Consistent with the law of occupation, the focus centers on the 
extent the new local government is bound by those decisions 
after the end of occupation.142 Although it is a general rule that 
occupation laws no longer necessarily apply upon the 
termination of occupation, the text of the law of occupation does 
not address itself to the specifics of legal norms that should 
govern the occupying state’s obligations in the period leading up 
to and during the end of occupation and its relations to the 
returning sovereign.143 The temporality principle for protecting 
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the sovereignty of the occupied territory, already much 
discussed, remains a general policy concern that is central to the 
fundamental principles of the law.144 
As such, the law of belligerent occupation traditionally does 
not take into account the implications for the occupying state at 
the end of occupation; its obligations end and the legal effects of 
its acts are for the local population and the returning sovereign 
to assess, then maintain or reject. During the first decades 
following World War II, discussions amongst scholars and 
tribunals regarding the implications of the end of occupation 
largely overlooked any presumed ongoing duties the occupier 
might have post-occupation.145 It is safe to say that the 
assumption of these discussions was that occupier’s obligations 
terminated with the end of occupation or, at most, by reference 
to a transfer of authority agreement. Post-occupation obligations 
in both the Hague law and Geneva law merely consist of 
transitional duties. Neither supplies positive duties that require 
the occupying state to continue to exercise administrative 
control beyond a limited transition period that, as noted earlier, 
is formally agreed to by the parties. 
The absence of continuing duties is significant. For example, 
Articles 53 and 54 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provide that 
certain items seized or destroyed by the occupant must “be 
restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.”146 The 
third paragraph of Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
(hereafter “Article 6(3)”) applies some duties to the occupying 
state and refers to cases of post-hostilities occupation, which is 
still belligerent occupation but only addresses the transitional 
period pending the conclusion of a peace treaty.147 These 
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provisions are striking because they either relate to 
compensation for wrongs committed during the occupation 
period, or else concern a specific transitional period as agreed 
among the parties. 
Article 6(3) of the Fourth Geneva Convention does provide 
that as long as the occupation is in progress and the occupying 
state still exercises governmental functions, the Convention’s 
provisions remain operative.148 Interpreting this Article, 
however, the ICJ pointed out that a distinction is made “between 
provisions applying during military operations leading to 
occupation and those that remain applicable throughout the 
entire period of occupation.”149 As a result, the ICJ said with 
regard to Israel that “[s]ince the military operations leading to 
the occupation of the West Bank in 1967 ended a long time ago, 
only those articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention referred to 
in Article 6(3) remain applicable in that occupied territory.”150 
This would seem to support the idea that the end of occupation 
is the winding down and termination of the occupier’s legal 
duties, save for the process of transition.151 
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In any event, Article 6(3) stipulates that the law of 
occupation is invoked to preserve the obligation of a state for the 
duration of occupation as long as it still exercises some 
governmental functions without the consent of the local 
population in the territory.152 
The Fourth Geneva Convention’s text regarding these 
obligations remains conceptually limited by reference to the 
temporality principle. It is practically limited by the fact that it 
contemplates a transition—a transfer from one party to another. 
The period is not a permanent condition, and interpretations of 
the law of occupation building on Article 6(3) must take this into 
account. The text was originally conceived to address a narrow 
transition regime limited in scope and time, and intended to 
balance both fundamental legal principles of the law of 
occupation, much discussed in this paper, as they appeared to 
the drafters of the Fourth Geneva Convention at the end of 
World War II: (1) ensuring civilian humanitarian protection and 
essential governance needs for security, order, and essential 
services; and (2) enforcing the temporary nature of an 
occupation to prevent creeping annexation.153 
The most accurate reading of the law of occupation, then, is 
that it does not itself provide or trigger anything other than a 
narrowly transitional regime of post-occupation obligations 
intended to transfer the rights and duties of governance over the 
occupied zone and its population to the returning sovereign. 
There is no positive rule or norm of post-occupation obligations 
in the sense of a continuing obligation to provide for the local 
population’s needs for public order and safety once the occupier 
has physically withdrawn. 
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Whatever the precise contours of the transition provisions 
of the law of occupation, they are no longer transitional if they 
turn out to be functionally permanent in practice. This is so 
whether one refers to duties toward the civilian population or 
rights over it. The law of occupation, as it developed over time, 
did not contemplate long-term occupations like Turkey in 
Northern Cyprus and Israel in Gaza, much less the kind of 
“transformative occupations” of today, such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Yet, as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) has always emphasized, IHL is sufficiently robust 
and flexible to adapt to changing circumstances without needing 
to adopt new legal prescriptions.154 
B. STATE PRACTICE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF POST-
OCCUPATION DUTIES 
In the actual practice of states, there is little support for the 
theory of post-occupation responsibility. Although not a 
consequence of occupation per se, cases such as Kosovo and East 
Timor have featured international administration of territories 
that, in practice, constituted an international mandate to 
rebuild the political, social, and economic institutions of the 
administered territory.155 In certain key aspects, the goals of 
post-occupation obligations and the law of occupation are 
analogous: “to govern on a temporary basis, and to strike a 
balance between overall administrative authority of the outside 
power and the non-alienability of the sovereignty of the territory 
concerned.”156 On the other hand, cases such as Kosovo and East 
Timor are essentially examples of international trusteeship, 
with a core feature that in each case the local population 
welcomed the outside international administration and forces 
because they saw them as protection against hostile forces 
outside the territory. In this regard, the contrast with genuinely 
belligerent occupation could not be more explicit.157 
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U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 regarding the end of 
United States-led powers in Iraq provided its own tools to ensure 
the occupying state’s accountability to and respect for the law.158 
Its approach differs from the situations described above, because 
the United States acknowledged that it was, for a time, an 
occupier under occupation law.159 In so doing, the resolution set 
an example for future occupations and could fill a serious gap in 
the law of belligerent occupation, possibly ensuring that 
territory is not left ungoverned during transitional periods. It 
does not alter the law of occupation as such, but instead 
supplements it with an exogenous legal authority via the 
Security Council. 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 might be offered to 
support the argument that, in some contemporary occupations, 
the occupying state is subject to additional duties toward the 
occupied population.160 The difficulty here is that the very 
existence of a Security Council resolution makes it unclear 
whether these duties conferred on United States-led forces as 
the occupier arise from the law of belligerent occupation or from 
the Security Council’s special legal authority.161 
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There was also concern in the Iraq case that the Security 
Council had overreached its jurisdiction, setting up a scenario 
where the law of occupation could not support all that it might 
be called upon to do.162 The transition to democracy represented 
a radical departure from the traditional conservationist 
principles underlying the law of belligerent occupation.163 
The broad mandate granted to the occupying powers in Iraq 
during the occupation (and long after its termination) tested the 
law of occupation’s limits.164 This action only became permissible 
as a result of the local population’s desperate economic and 
political situation, the full accountability of the occupying states 
with the Security Council, the Security Council’s ratification, 
and the fact that the occupiers clearly lacked any territorial 
aspirations toward Iraq.165 This scenario was largely enabled 
because the occupying state remained present with its military 
troops within the territory of the newly re-enshrined sovereign, 
the new Iraqi government, which gave its consent for the former 
occupier to conduct basic security missions and carry on these 
obligations.166 Had United States-led forces not been physically 
present in the territory, such tasks likely would have been 
impossible to carry out—irrespective of whether there was a 
claim of a post-occupation legal obligation to maintain public 
security and order. Thus, it would be difficult to draw the legal 
conclusion that occupation carries post-occupation obligations 
on the former occupier from the sparse incidence of state practice 
with respect to acknowledged occupation. 
C. SCHOLARLY VIEWS ON THE EXISTENCE (OR NOT) OF POST 
OCCUPATION OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE LAW OF 
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 
Some scholars who support the argument that the law of 
occupation creates post-occupation obligations claim that legal 
norms for these obligations logically derive from the law of 
belligerent occupation itself.167 Cassese, for example, argues 
that the body of the law of occupation should be interpreted in a 
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“flexible” way with a process of “adjustment” to the new context 
in which contemporary conflicts operate, while maintaining its 
original objectives and principles.168 Consequently, in his view, 
the Hague Regulations should be interpreted in light of 
developments in international law and the factual developments 
that have occurred since its drafting in 1907, with a particular 
eye to cases of prolonged occupation.169 
In Roberts’ view, since determining the precise moment 
occupation ends may hold less significance, the current priority 
is applying the law in a wide variety of situations, even 
occasionally where no occupation has been declared to exist, or 
in cases where occupation has been pronounced terminated.170 
Benvenisti suggests that the obligations of occupying states 
under the law of occupation should be interpreted as also 
entailing obligations to ensure ongoing public order and civil life 
as much as possible, not only during the occupation, but also 
immediately after its end and during the transition of authority 
to the sovereign local government.171 Therefore, Benvenisti 
stresses that the nineteenth-century conception based on Article 
43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations should be interpreted without 
its traditional constraints and instead with contemporary 
perceptions of the broad authority post-conflict societies require 
for preventing chaos and restoring public order.172 
Rubin suggests that restricting the ability of the occupying 
state to withdraw from the occupied territory before reaching 
resolution of all territorial issues is against existing legal 
principle.173 He also holds that extending the state of occupation 
beyond the actual period of occupation negates the principle that 
occupation should reflect facts on the ground.174 Additionally he 
suggests a better approach would be to enable the occupying 
state to end its presence in the occupied territory without 
terminating its responsibilities toward it.175 Once the occupying 
state is no longer in effective control of the territory, the trigger 
to apply post-occupation obligations in the scope of the law of 
occupation should derive from either the consent or request of 
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the local government or a decision of the international 
community.176 
This canvassing of different scholarly views on the question 
of post- occupation obligations points to a general dissatisfaction 
with what is, in fact, the law of occupation as legal text: a strict 
binary. It makes excellent sense, as these eminent scholars say, 
that foreign occupying forces are permitted to remain and 
support the transition in a transformative occupation, such as 
Iraq. This type of movement—from “occupier” to “invited 
guest”—permits flexibility in the obligations and powers of an 
occupier/invited guest during the transition; however, scholars 
generally note that in such cases, the occupation is actually no 
longer belligerent but in a different process—for example, a legal 
or constructive international trusteeship. 
Still other commentators insist that the law of occupation 
addresses belligerent occupation. Accordingly, transformative 
occupations and similar processes should apply the appropriate 
bodies of law after the occupation, such as deferring to the 
special authorities of the Security Council.177 The law of 
occupation provides the occupying power with coercive measures 
for installing its authority.178 It is therefore problematic to argue 
that these measures should extend after the end of occupation, 
when it is impossible to assign the ousted local government any 
measures of governance without legitimacy and consent granted 
by the returning sovereign. For that matter, some commentators 
note that the law of occupation applies only to define 
contemporary war-to-peace transitions of international 
character where the occupier must be exercising effective control 
while physically present in the occupied territory, and the actors 
involved must be contracting parties to the Geneva Conventions 
for its application.179 If these are the terms, it is impossible to 
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draw post-occupation obligations from the law of occupation 
after occupation terminates. 
It is hard to argue with this admittedly hardline reaction 
against turning the law of occupation into an exceedingly flexible 
body of law for foreign forces on another sovereign’s territory. 
The more open approach compromises, after all, the 
fundamental principle of the law of occupation—the temporality 
principle. It also engages a level of wishful thinking regarding 
the many obligations this would impose on the international 
community. Perhaps the best conclusion to draw from these 
unsettled, cross-cutting positions adopted by commentators and 
scholars is that the law of belligerent occupation does not create 
a regime of ongoing post-occupation obligations beyond its 
textual transition regime. Above all, in my view, the law of 
belligerent occupation must be preserved distinctly for its 
unique function: belligerent occupation. 
There are many possibilities that might trouble both a 
former occupier and a newly restored sovereign with respect to 
ongoing obligations claimed to derive from the law of occupation 
after the occupation ends. These possibilities bear noting as a 
caution against excessive enthusiasm for finding ways to 
establish such obligations. One way to understand the cautions 
against excessively embracing post-occupation duties grounded 
in the law of occupation is to ask why, if this approach is so 
obvious and promising, the formal law of occupation has not 
already evolved toward formal acceptance of a regime of post-
occupation law. The answer takes us back to the temporality 
principle.180 Despite its honorable origin in a desire to render 
illegal the annexation of territory through occupation that was a 
feature of World War II, this principle seemed somehow quaint 
after the end of the Cold War and the celebration of the decline 
of sovereignty. Such a perspective seems less desirable today, as 
many international actors look, for example, to Russia’s behavior 
in Crimea, and suddenly discover a new enthusiasm for 
embracing it.181 A deliberate blurring of the lines between 
occupation and invitation no longer seems quite as desirable, at 
least not without Security Council authority or protection. As 
mentioned, Turkey’s activities in Northern Cyprus offer another 
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relevant example.182 One conclusion that could be drawn by 
sovereigns whose territory is under full or partial occupation, 
whether formally acknowledged by the occupier or not, is that 
they indeed want a clear line between occupation and non-
occupation. This line is desirable because they legitimately fear 
the consequences to their security and territorial integrity 
without it. 
Although post-occupation obligations derive from situations 
of occupation, it does not follow that the status of occupation or 
the law of occupation continues to apply after the elements of 
occupation have been removed. As Benvenisti implies, in order 
for genuine standards of post-occupation obligations to emerge 
and be adopted by occupying powers, they should be governed by 
principles of focus and limitation.183 Applying the law of 
occupation in the post-occupation phase, with all of its 
obligations specific to the physical presence of the occupier, 
ignores occupation law’s fundamental basis of effective control, 
which is largely removed at the stage of post-occupation.184 
Moving in this direction, would give few incentives to the 
occupying state to end an occupation and allow the local 
sovereign government to establish stable administration over 
the territory. Removing the law of occupation from its original 
role of temporarily restoring and maintaining public order in an 
occupied territory and installing it as a law for rebuilding 
indigenous local government with legitimate authority and 
governance capacity is a perilous enterprise. 
Although under some circumstances it might even be 
politically desirable within the international community for an 
occupier to continue its occupation as long as the sovereign of 
that territory is unprepared or unable to take effective control, 
there is no legal obligation on the occupier to maintain its 
occupation; an occupier is always legally free to withdraw. For 
that matter, we should not neglect the possibility that an 
occupier will be militarily forced to withdraw in the setting of an 
ongoing armed conflict, even though this action could leave the 
territory ungoverned. 
 
 182. See supra notes 62–64. 
 183. Benvenisti, Unilateral Termination, supra note 7. 
 184. Roberts, supra note 22, § 48, at 8. 
2018] POST-OCCUPATION OBLIGATIONS 53 
V. TRANSITIONAL POST-OCCUPATION OBLIGATIONS 
ARISING UNDER AN EXPANSIVE READING OF 
THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 
The legal conclusions produced by the law of belligerent 
occupation leave a significant, unsatisfying gap between the 
doctrinal law as it stands today, and current situations of 
occupation and its aftermath. It is not just that the legal 
conclusions are simply outdated or anachronistic. On the 
contrary, the legal conclusions that occupation ends upon the 
physical withdrawal of forces from the territory, thereby 
extinguishing the legal duties tied to it, have an important 
justification in the fundamental motivations underlying the law 
of belligerent occupation—the temporality principle. The 
“binary” position—that occupation and the ensuing rights and 
duties for an occupier are either “on” or “off”—is not just an 
accurate description of the law, it also lays down a clear, bright 
line that distinguishes when an occupier is entitled to exercise 
authority in a foreign territory and when it is not. 185As we have 
seen, the difficulty with this approach is that the binary does not 
suit how foreign forces begin and end their occupations of 
another’s territory and address its population in the diverse 
situations of occupation so prevalent today. 
The law of belligerent occupation does not create ongoing 
post-occupation duties, and the failure of civilian protection is 
simply the tradeoff for ensuring that a former occupier actually 
gives up its prerogatives. Rather, it seems that the law of 
belligerent occupation does offer certain possibilities for 
addressing this problem of civilian protection through an 
expanded understanding of its existing terms on coordinated 
transitions from the former occupier to returning sovereign. 
A. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSITIONAL POST-
OCCUPATION OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE LAW OF 
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 
It is suggested that some form of limited transitional post-
occupation obligations (as opposed to post-occupation obligations 
and duties on the departing occupier alone) should be triggered 
under certain circumstances. These include when the end of 
occupation is not a specific moment concluded by a peace 
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agreement and where the specific circumstances indicate that 
authority will not be fully restored with the end of occupation.186 
Thus, when it is known, as in the cases of Gaza, South Lebanon, 
and Iraq, for example, that the end of occupation is approaching 
and gaps in essential governance are an issue, transitional post-
occupation obligations should be limited in time and scope and 
reached by negotiation or coordination of the international 
community. 
The Fourth Geneva Convention refers, in Article 6(3), to the 
cessation of the application of the Convention a year after the 
general close of military operations.187 It then provides that 
certain measures bind the occupier “for the duration of the 
occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the functions 
of government in such territory,” and goes on to list specific 
provisions of the Convention.188 AP1 removes the one-year 
limitation by reference to the continuing safekeeping of 
protected persons as defined by the Convention.189 
For the purpose of examining what possibilities exist of an 
expanded, yet disciplined, reading of the law of belligerent 
occupation in these and other provisions, however, we note that 
they point implicitly to a transitional period during which 
protected persons continue to be protected, but under which the 
occupier withdraws. And, as it withdraws with respect to 
exercising the “functions of government”—its obligations as well 
as its rights extinguish themselves. Although Article 6(3) does 
not specifically mention the returning sovereign in the context 
of the transfer of governance authority, it is clear that it 
transfers back, to the returning sovereign.190 This is consistent 
with the conservationist temporality principle of the law of 
belligerent occupation. 
The Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention clearly 
suggests that the occupier may gradually reduce its obligations 
and authority as the returning sovereign gradually assumes 
them.191 Although the language of the Convention ceases to 
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apply one year following the close of general hostilities, the 
Commentary goes on to make clear that some form of occupation 
authorities, functions, and obligations may well last beyond a 
year (it references Japan and Germany) and contemplates 
exactly this type of sliding scale.192 Yet the Commentary is 
referring, in this case, not to post-occupation obligations but 
instead to occupation obligations of an occupation that is still 
ongoing.193 
 
out at the Diplomatic Conference, however, that if the occupation were to 
continue for a very long time after the general cessation of hostilities, a time 
would doubtless come when the application of the Convention was no longer 
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world public opinion will, moreover, have some effect. Furthermore, two cases 
of an occupation being prolonged after the cessation of hostilities can be 
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be freed before one year has passed; on the other hand, if the Occupying Power 
is victorious, the occupation may last more than a year, but as hostilities have 
ceased, stringent measures against the civilian population will no longer be 
justified.”).  
How is the end of the occupation of an occupied territory to be 
determined? Recent events, and present history, have shown that the 
conditions under which wars terminate have undergone a profound 
change; and that occupation involves far more than it did formerly. It 
therefore seems logical and judicious to provide for a minimum period 
during which the provisions should continue to be enforced, a period 
fixed at one year after the general conclusion of military operations. 
Should occupation continue after that date, it appears normal that the 
Occupying Power should gradually hand over the various powers it 
exercises, and the direction of the various administrative departments, 
to authorities consisting of nationals of the Occupied Power. From that 
time on, the Occupying Power will, of course, no longer be in a position 
to undertake all the duties for which it was responsible as long as it 
continues to exercise the full prerogatives of the occupied State. A choice 
should therefore be made between provisions intended to protect the 
population of the occupied territory while occupation continues, and 
those, on the contrary, which should cease to apply as soon as the 
justification for them, namely, the exercise of powers by the Occupying 
Power, has ceased to exist.  
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What could be understood to arise from this structure is the 
possibility of not exactly “post” occupation duties on the former 
occupier but instead a “transitional” regime of the occupier’s 
prerogatives and duties as it gradually ceases to exercise the 
functions of government in that territory—by reference to the 
“duration of the occupation” language of Article 6(3)—for as long 
as the occupation continues. To reiterate, the transitional period 
might be conceived to cover the period of time – perhaps brief, 
perhaps longer—that the occupation continues, and the occupier 
continues to exercise rights and duties of governance in the 
territory. By its conception, this phase is transitional and 
temporary, consistent with the temporality principle of the law 
of belligerent occupation; but it is also protective of civilians in 
the transition itself.194 
What about the returning sovereign? The provisions of the 
1907 Hague Regulations (Articles 43, 55) insist that the 
governance character of the occupied territory be preserved 
except to the extent of military necessity—and by reference to 
the (eventual) returning sovereign.195 These provisions 
demonstrate the intrinsic role of the returning sovereign during 
transition—the sovereign’s governance rights and duties 
increasing as the occupier’s rights and duties diminish. It is a 
meaningful actor in this transfer. To be clear, I do not want to 
overstate the textual basis for asserting that the returning 
sovereign has rights and duties in relation to the “transfer back” 
of governance authority—Article 6 does not directly mention the 
returning sovereign. But, in light of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention’s commentary, this approach seems the best reading 
of the provisions of the law, seeking to conserve the governance 
character of the occupied zone and its population as far as 
possible in contemplation of the return of the ousted sovereign. 
If this conception holds sway as the general construction of the 
law of belligerent occupation, then it seems reasonable to view 
this interpretation as the best way to understand the 
transitional period during which governmental authority is 
transitioned back to the returning sovereign. The implication, 
however, is that in order to spare the civilian population a 
vacuum of governance, the returning sovereign takes up the 
rights and duties of governance in its sovereign territory as the 
departing occupier gives theirs. 
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Maximum coordination best ensures the least risk of 
civilians being left without protection through governance, but 
in many circumstances, coordination is likely to fall far short of 
the ideal. But, this approach diverges from other proposals for 
post-occupation duties in that it is not simply a set of obligations 
that fall upon the former occupier that lack the requirement of 
transition, it imposes the weight of the transfer onto the 
returning sovereign.196 
Such an extensive reading and interpretation of the law of 
belligerent occupation is in line with the fundamental rule of 
treaty interpretation as articulated in article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties: “A treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose.”197 Analyzing the commentary of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention and its original meaning, the 
argument for transitional post-occupation obligations rests on 
the following foundational pillars: (1) the object and purpose of 
ending occupation, described as a transition process during 
which governmental authorities are being transferred from the 
occupying power to the returning sovereign; (2) the legal 
principle of the law of belligerent occupation that assumes that 
the end of occupation is concluded by agreement or consent;198 
(3) the balance that the law of occupation strives to maintain 
between the two underlying principles of civilian protection and 
temporality to protect territory’s sovereignty; (4) the IHL legal 
principle of civilian protection, articulated in the Marten Clause, 
that protects civilians and belligerents, even in situations 
arising from armed conflict that were not anticipated by specific 
treaty provisions;199 (5) the evolving customary obligation to 
negotiate in good faith in an attempt to end occupation.200 From 
all of the above, one might reasonably argue that the current 
realities of occupation indeed require the departing occupying 
power to accept modest transitional post-occupation duties. This 
is a “plausible” and practical reading and interpretation of the 
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law of belligerent occupation in its texts on transitions out of 
occupation. 
B. A PROPOSAL FOR TRANSITIONAL POST-OCCUPATION 
DUTIES: POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON THE INCENTIVES AND 
DISINCENTIVES OF THE DEPARTING OCCUPIER AND THE 
RETURNING SOVEREIGN 
The fact that transitional post-occupation obligations are 
reciprocal duties rather than ongoing one-sided obligations of 
the former occupier offers the first incentive for their adoption. 
These obligations would fall upon both parties (departing 
occupier and returning sovereign) in three main scenarios: (1) an 
occupying state unilaterally withdraws to end the occupation, 
yet its actions still affect the territory; (2) an occupying state’s 
armed forces remain in the territory following the end of 
occupation for reasons related to operational military necessity 
with respect to the conflict itself, but they are not exercising the 
authorities of governance required for occupation; or, 
alternatively, the occupying state’s forces leave the territory 
physically, but continue to undertake military operations 
remotely as a matter of military necessity in the unresolved 
conflict; or (3) a successor transitional administration takes over 
governance of the territory but still needs the involvement of the 
former occupying state, as a practical matter, for the duration of 
the transition.201 
Accordingly, transitional post-occupation obligations would 
mean that the occupying state could be subject to certain 
transitional duties over the former occupying territory even after 
the formal end of occupation—but conceptually, only as a matter 
of transition and not as an ongoing unlimited one-sided 
obligation. While the former occupying state continues to carry 
post-occupation obligations, the incoming power must assume 
responsibilities as part of its assumption of sovereign 
authority.202 Gradually the burden to provide for the local 
population shifts to the sovereign authority.203 The length of this 
transition would be determined by facts on the ground as well 
as, preferably, negotiations among the parties and perhaps also 
with international authorities that could (in some 
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circumstances) take on certain governance tasks with respect to 
the civilian population.204 
In other words, as other scholars have suggested, occupation 
can be ended without the automatic extinguishing of every 
obligation but only during a transitional period when it is known 
that the occupying power’s intention is to end the occupation.205 
Transitional post-occupation obligations should be premised on 
the continued concern for civil life after the end of occupation 
and on the specific, practical reason that such concerns exist.206 
During the transitional period, the local government is 
obliged to restore its independent authority and either avoid 
developing a dependency on the former occupying state or 
coordinate in consenting to an ongoing dependency, if necessary, 
for ensuring public order and safety for the local population. 
Each case should be examined in light of specific circumstances 
to determine which transitional post-occupations apply to the 
parties and how best to enact the gradual process of ultimately 
transferring all authority to the local sovereign.207 
Ideally, this process would take place simultaneously and 
with parallel commitments, so that the former occupying state 
would continue to bear responsibility for authorities that the 
local government could not yet perform, while at the same time 
it would transfer the appropriate, immediately achievable duties 
to the local government. The local government then must do 
whatever is necessary to cooperate with the former occupying 
state to build its capacity during a limited period of time to 
achieve its full independence. During the transitional period, 
much emphasis should be placed on the future destiny of 
independent authority in the territory, and the ongoing 
obligations of the former occupier should be structured to assist 
this aim. 
Since they are reciprocal, transitional post-occupation 
obligations also must address the needs of the occupying state, 
taking into account security measures for its population during 
the transitional period, especially if the conflict is continuing. An 
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ongoing armed conflict that continues against the former 
occupier may have the effect of reducing the level of transitional 
post-occupation responsibilities applied to the latter. This could 
be especially true in circumstances in which post-occupation 
services and provisions are used as a military measure against 
the former occupying state by the local government and the 
former occupied territory. 
The second incentive for the adoption of transitional post-
occupation obligations is the utilization of negotiation or 
coordination by the international community rather than the 
reliance on coercive measures after the end of occupation. The 
terms should be negotiated or coordinated once it is known that 
the end of occupation is approaching—that is, in the final stages 
of an occupation when there is a risk that the withdrawal of the 
occupying state will leave the territory ungoverned. One typical 
indication of this kind of scenario that occurred in the cases of 
both Gaza and Southern Lebanon is the announcement of the 
intended withdrawal date of military troops, which also signified 
an implied loss of ensured public order and safety.208 
Occasionally, political rather than legal considerations 
might prevent the parties or the international community from 
recognizing the end of occupation in order to prevent the release 
of the occupying state from its obligations. That outcome, 
however, is inconsistent with core principles of the law of 
belligerent occupation, and adopting transitional post-
occupation obligations on both the former occupying state and 
the returning sovereign could offer a solution. When the end of 
occupation is both within reach and yet not assured, voluntarily 
assumed, transitional post-occupation obligations should be 
used as a means to clarify responsibilities while assuring that 
the territory is not left ungoverned or in a highly unstable state. 
When transitional post-occupation obligations are required 
where the conflict continues, or where the conflict is ended but 
the former adversaries are far from friends and negotiation 
seems impossible, it is the role of the international community 
to step in for the coordination of transitional post-occupation 
obligations for both sides. This must occur while recognizing that 
occupation has ended, setting the conditions for the transition 
period, without which the occupying power would not be released 
from its obligations and the returning sovereign would formally 
hold responsibility for the territory, whether or not it was 
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prepared to do so.209 
The international community’s coordination is vital here in 
order to maintain effective control after occupation has ended 
and until the returning sovereign is able to restore its authority. 
It should also be noted that exercising effective control after the 
end of occupation requires the legitimacy and consent of the local 
government in the former occupied territory.210 The 
interpretation of the Fourth Geneva Convention implies 
reciprocal post-occupation duties for a transitional period only, 
but in order to apply them, the former occupier must have 
legitimacy.211 
Realizing “legitimacy” in the context of transitional post-
occupation obligations may be difficult. Politically, the feelings 
of the local population might be so strained that even if the 
society accepts transitional post-occupation obligations, the 
reality would only allow the acceptance of funds for 
compensation but nothing beyond that. Legitimacy for the 
application of transitional post-occupation obligations that 
entail the ongoing exercise of effective control can be realized 
when no tensions between the former occupying power’s interest 
in maintaining its security and the local population’s interest in 
maintaining its security and welfare exist—typically, this occurs 
when the government of the territory has consented to the 
involvement of the former occupying power. Such consent must 
not have been obtained under duress and must be expressed by 
an authority that is empowered to bind the government 
concerned.212 
The third incentive for the adoption of transitional post-
occupation obligations is that they are temporary, transitional 
measures, utilized only until the returning or new local regime 
has developed independent authority to ensure public order and 
 
 209. See U.N. Doc. S/2000/460, supra note 126 (explaining Israel and 
Lebanese military relations). 
 210. Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 
WIS. L. REV. 379, 380–82 (1983). “Legitimacy’ of a social order is the effective 
belief in its binding or obligatory quality.” Id. at 380. “It is a state of widespread 
belief; namely, the belief that an order is obligatory or exemplary. Moreover, 
the belief is a reason for action.” Id. at 382. “[I]n general, the greater the 
legitimacy, i.e., the greater the observed belief in the obligatory qualities of an 
order, the greater the conformity to the norms believed legitimate.” Id. Ferraro, 
supra note 15, at 152, 153. 
 211. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 27, arts. 2–3. 
 212. See generally Zwanenburg, supra note 16, at 37–41 (discussing 
occupation with prior or existing military conflict). 
62 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:1 
safety for the local population; they are not ongoing obligations 
for an unknown period of time.213 The main challenge is to 
determine when the returning or new local government has 
indeed developed its own capability of independence.214 Such a 
determination should also consider when the new or returning 
local government should have reasonably developed 
independence, not just when the local government has actually 
gained independence.215 In some cases, all means have been 
provided for the local government to exercise its own 
administrative authority, and yet these resources are 
misappropriated. Common examples include corruption of the 
new regime or its funding of militant activities. In such cases, 
the local government might find it convenient that the former 
occupying state has ongoing responsibilities instead of 
addressing these issues itself. 
A good reference point to assess the ability of the local 
government to exercise effective control may be the pre-
occupation condition of the former occupied territory, although 
that assessment can be misleading in cases of prolonged 
occupation or when the right of self-determination is fulfilled for 
the first time.216 The danger lies in imposing the costs, in effect, 
of a newly returned or newly established local administration’s 
corruption or incompetence, potentially in perpetuity, on the 
former occupier, which will dissuade it from fulfilling its own 
obligations. 
The length of time that transitional post-occupation 
obligations should apply, then, would depend on the specific local 
conditions, and the obligations should end when the local 
government is in a position to govern, or when the humanitarian 
needs of the local population are no longer attributable to the 
end of occupation but instead to the local government.217 As 
discussed, great emphasis should be placed on not allowing bad 
governance to be rewarded by externalizing those costs onto the 
former occupier. Transitional post-occupation obligations should 
therefore come with incentives as part of the framework for the 
local government to ensure the establishment and rebuilding of 
all that is required to effectively self-govern and restore public 
 
 213. Benvenisti, Unilateral Termination, supra note 7, at 371, 381; Rubin, 
supra note 25, at 553–54. 
 214. Ronen, supra note 7, at 432. 
 215. Rubin, supra note 25, at 553–54. 
 216. Ronen, supra note 7, at 432. 
 217. Rubin, supra note 25, at 553–54. 
2018] POST-OCCUPATION OBLIGATIONS 63 
order and safety. 
The level of dependency of the local population on the 
services and infrastructure provided by the former occupier state 
during occupation could be a critical practical factor for devising 
and negotiating the duration of transitional post-occupation 
obligations. Whether a local population’s dependency on the 
occupying state resulted from the period of occupation is a 
consideration, and territorial contiguity might impact the scope 
and extent of such obligations, as dependency is more likely 
when the occupying state is merely across the border.218 If the 
local population is not economically dependent upon the 
occupying state, then perhaps transitional post-occupation 
obligations are not necessary, apart from the transition regime 
already contemplated in the law of belligerent occupation.219 If 
there is only financial dependency, then post-occupation 
obligations may be different from and more limited than those 
required after the end of the occupation in cases where the 
economy is actually intertwined with that of the occupying 
state.220 Clearly, historical sensitivity and contextual awareness 
will always be crucial in the construction of any transitional post 
occupation obligations. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The law of belligerent occupation does not create one-sided 
post-occupation obligations in itself because it is concerned not 
only with civilian protection, but also with ensuring that 
occupation should be a temporary condition. It contemplates the 
return of the legitimate sovereign and ensures that occupation 
(or post-occupation duties) do not become a mechanism for 
creeping annexation and de facto conquest of territory. Yet with 
regard to contemporary conflicts, which do not always fit the 
legal binary paradigm of ending occupation, this law leaves the 
possibility that in satisfying the conditions of the second 
principle, temporality and return of the legitimate sovereign, a 
serious gap may exist with regard to the first principle, civilian 
 
 218. Ronen, supra note 7, at 434 (explaining dependency is not necessarily a 
result of the occupying state’s wrongdoing; it can also be a consequence of 
conforming to the law of belligerent occupation requirements). 
 219. See Ronen, supra note 7, at 435 (discussing occupant obligations under 
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations). 
 220. E.g., id. at 433 (referencing the economic dependence of Northern 
Cyprus on Turkey). 
64 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:1 
protection. To fill the vacuum, the law of belligerent occupation 
could be interpreted, based on Article 6(3) of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, to better accommodate contemporary situations of 
occupation. 
It is suggested that some form of limited transitional post-
occupation obligations should be triggered under certain 
circumstances—among others, when the end of occupation is not 
a specific moment concluded by a peace agreement and where 
the specific circumstances indicate that authority will not be 
fully restored with the end of occupation. Thus, when it is known 
that the end of occupation is approaching and gaps in essential 
governance are an issue, transitional post-occupation 
obligations should be limited in time and scope and reached by 
negotiation or coordination of the international community. 
The interpretation of Article 6(3) of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention for transitional post-occupation obligations suggests 
that the law of belligerent occupation contains more possibilities 
on its own terms than may have previously been thought—and 
that in important respects, such an approach extends toward 
resolving some of the tensions among the fundamental purposes 
underlying the law, minimizing the risk that territory would be 
left ungoverned. It also achieves some effect in addressing the 
issues of incentives and disincentives regarding the departing 
occupier and returning sovereign. 
The approach locating transitional post-occupation 
obligations under the law of belligerent occupation with respect 
to today’s conflicts and occupations (whether acknowledged by 
the occupier or not), cautions against creating post-occupation 
obligations solely for the former occupier. To foster an effective 
transition between occupation and post-occupation the 
returning sovereign should assume some obligations as well. The 
“transitional post-occupation duties” then, are an attempt to 
coordinate the transfer of obligations from occupation to post-
occupation—from occupier to returning sovereign—in a manner 
that fulfills the civilian humanitarian protection requirements, 
even if a formal end to occupation has not been achieved yet. 
The weight of international legal norms regarding the local 
population’s protection, together with respect for sovereignty, 
means that the parties have an obligation to negotiate with each 
other in good faith, as the circumstances of the conflict permit, 
in order to achieve a coordinated satisfaction of humanitarian 
protection for the affected civilian population while ensuring 
fulfillment of the territory’s sovereignty. Beyond that, any terms 
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more specific than the general motivations of the law of 
belligerent occupation seem able to be satisfied by negotiations 
between the parties, and, if needed, with the encouragement and 
coordination of international authorities in ways that reflect the 
realities of any particular conflict and occupation. 
Applying transitional post-occupation obligations in the 
suggested manner maintains the temporary nature of 
occupation, encouraging occupying states to end occupation 
without the risk of unlimited ongoing obligations, even as it 
requires that they shed an occupier’s rights. Although it cannot 
motivate sovereigns essentially uninterested in civilian 
protection, either the departing occupier or the returning 
sovereign, this approach can at least indicate to them that their 
obligations are reciprocal. The requirement of a “handing-over” 
of obligations is a sliding scale process, limited in time and scope, 
until responsibility for governance is fully restored and the local 
population is at least potentially protected. For the occupying 
power, it diminishes the worry that it would remain responsible 
for the local population as long as the local sovereign failed to 
fully exercise governmental authority, no matter the reason and 
duration. For the local government, it diminishes the worry that 
an occupying state would use post-occupation duties as an 
excuse for continuing its control over the territory, eventually 
raising the risk of annexation in the name of civilian protection. 
The uneasy fit between many contemporary conflicts and 
the paradigm of ending occupation according to international 
law is an immediate problem that renders local populations 
dangerously vulnerable, and will continue to do so. Therefore, 
the need for a measured and practical approach, such as 
transitional post-occupation obligations that can address 
occupations in the current context, is essential. 
